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INTRODUCTION
The STS-49SpaceShuttleProgramMissionReportcontainsa summaryof the
Orbiter,ExternalTank (ET),SolidRocketBooster/RedesignedSolidRocketMotor
(SRB/RSRM),and SpaceShuttlemainengine(SSME)subsystemperformanceduring
the forty-seventhflightof theSpaceShuttleProgramand the firstflightof
theOrbitervehicleEndeavour(OV-105).In additionto theEndeavourvehicle,
the flightvehicleconsistedof an ET designatedas ET-43(LWT-36);threeSSME's
whichwere serialnumbers2030,2015,and 2017in positionsI, 2, and 3,
respectively;and two SRB'sdesignatedas BI-050. The lightweightRSRM's
installedin each SRBwere designatedas 360LO22Afor theleftRSRM and 360L022B
for therightRSRM.
This STS-49SpaceShuttleProgramMissionReportfulfillsthe SpaceShuttle
Programrequirement,as documentedin NSTS07700,VolumeVIII,AppendixE, which
statesthateachmajororganizationsupportingthe Programwill reportthe
resultsof itshardwareevaluationand missionperformanceplus identifyall
relatedin-flightanomalies.
The primary objectives of this flight were to perform the operations necessary
to re-boost the International Telecommunications Satellite VI (INTELSAT VI)
spacecraft and to fulfill the requirements of the Assembly of Station by
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Methods (ASEM) payload. The secondary objectives
of the flight were to perform the operations of the Commercial Protein Crystal
Growth (CPCG), Block II payload; the Air Force Maul Optical Sire Calibration
P Test (AMOS); and the Ultraviolet Plume Instrument (UVPI); all of which were
flown as payloads of opportunity. In addition, 18 development test objectives
(DTO's) and 13 detailed supplementary objectives (DSO's) were assigned to this
flight.
The sequence of events for the STS-49 mission,plannedas a 7-day mission is
shown in Table I, and the officialOrbiterand GFE Projects ProblemTracking
List is shown in Table II. In addition,each Orbiter,ET, SSME, and SRBIRSRM
subsystemanomaly is discussedin the applicablesubsystemsectionof the
report,and a referenceto the assigned trackingnumber is providedwhen the
anomaly is mentioned in the report. All times shown in the text of the report
are in both Greenwichmean time (G.m.t.)and missionelapsed rime (MET).
The crew for this forty-seventh Space Shuttle flight was Daniel C. Brandenstein,
Capt., USN, Commander; Kevin P. Chilton, Lt. Col., USAF, Pilot; Richard J. Hieb,
Mission Specialist I; Bruce E. Melnick, Cmdr., USCG, Mission Specialist 2;
Pierre J. Thuot, Cmdr., USN, Mission Specialist 3; Kathryn C. Thorton, Ph.D,
Mission Specialist 4; and Thomas D. Akers, Lt. Col., USAF, Mission Specialist 5.
STS-49 is the fourth space flight for the Commander, the second space flight for
all of the mission specialists, and the first space flight for the Pilot.
SUMMARY
The STS-49 mission was launched from Kennedy Space Center launch complex 39B at
128:23:40:00.019 G.m.t. (7:40:00 p.m.e.d.t.) on May 7, 1992, on an inclination
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of 28.35degrees. The launchphasewas satisfactoryin all respects.
The successful aunchof Endeavourwas precededby a flightreadinessfiring ......
(FRF)of the SSME's,whichwas conductedon April6, 1992,for the purposeof
verifyingthatall subsystemsonboardthenew Orbiterwere readyfor flight.
AlthoughtheOrbiterand integratedvehiclesubsystemswere successfully
verifiedduringthe FRF,anomalieswere identifiedthatwereassociatedwith the
threenew SSME's. As a result,all threeSSME'swere replacedon the launchpad
followingthe flightreadinessfiring.
The reactioncontrolsubsystem(RCS)thrusterF4R heaterwas notedto be failed
on when theheaterswitcheswere positionedto "on"duringthe prelaunch
operations.The F4R heaterwas manuallycycledthroughout hemission,and the
thrustertemperatureswere maintainedwithinlimits.
At T-29 minutesin the launchcountdown,a transientmastereventscontroller
(MEC)2 Fire 2/Fire3 commandbuilt-intestequipment(BITE)bit was foundto be
set. Two subsequentpreflightBITEreadswere performedand thebit was 0 (no
failureindicated).Analysisof thisoccurrencerevealedno concernsfor flying
as-issincethe BITEwas not a hard failure,andwas most likelyan intermittent
BITE failureof theHEC. In addition,the failurewouldmost likelyaffectonly
one coreof MEC 2 and the remainingcorein MEC 2 as wellas both coresin HEC 1
providedadequateredundancyto performall MEC functionseven if thiswere a
hard failure.
Duringand afterET cryogenicsloading,theauxiliarypowerunit (APU)3 fuel
testline temperature2 violatedthe lowerLaunchCommitCriteria(LCC)limitof
48 °F. The heatercycledto lows of 47 °F. Sincetheheaterwas operating
normallywith constantheatercycles,a waiverfor this temperatureviolation
was approved. Afterascent,theheaterswere activatedand all temperatures
remainedin thenominalrangethroughout hemission.
At the completionof the orbitalmaneuveringsubsystem(OMS)2 maneuverat
129:00:22:02.6G.m.t.(00:00:39:57MET),Endeavourwas placedin a 183 nml.
circularorbit. The payloadbay dooropeningsequencewas completedat
129:01:20:00G.m.t.(00:01:40:00MET),and theKu-bandantennawas deployedat
129:02:53:00G.m.t.(00:02:13:00MET). The firstrendezvousmaneuverwas
initiatedat 129:04:52:44.2G.m.t.(00:05:12:00MET). Cabindepressurizationto
10.2 psiawas initiatedat 129:19:00G.m.t.(00:19:20:00MET) in preparationfor
the plannedEVA's.
The firstEVA was performedon flightday 4. Airlockdepressurizationwas
initiatedat 131:20:17G.m.t.(02:20:37MET),and theairlockouterhatchwas
opened8 minuteslater. Numerousattemptswere madeby the EVl crewpersonto
engagetheINTELSATsatellitewith the capturebar. The unsuccessfulattempts
resultedin the satellitebeingpushedawayand wobbling.Afterthe
unsuccessfulcaptureattempts,the capturebar was restowedand the payloadbay
cleanupwas completed.Airlockrepressurizationwas initiatedat
132:00:51G.m.t.(03:00:35MET)with a totalEVA durationof 3 hours43 minutes.
The secondEVA, performedon flightday 5, was initiatedwith airlock
depressurizationat approximately132:20:30G.m.t.(03:20:50MET). The capture
bar was againunstowedand the EVl practicedsatellitecaptureby bumpingthe --_
capturebar againsta payloadbay handrail.Numerouscaptureattemptswere
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againmade,all of whichwereunsuccessful.Aftercapturebar stowageand
payloadbay cleanup,the two crewpersonsenteredtheairlockand
repressurizationwas initiatedat 133:02:31G.m.t.(04:02:51MET) for a total
extravehiculartimeof 5 hours29 minutes. Communicationsoperationsthroughout
the EVAwere excellent.
Day 6 was spent planning the third EVA details,which includeda three-person
EVA to capture the INTELSATsatellite. Chamber runs and WeightlessEnvironment
Training Facility (WETF) runs were performedat JSC in supportof this EVA
planning.
During the rendezvouswith the INTELSATprior to the third EVA, the fault
message "TGT ITER 12" was unexpectedlyannunciatedwhen the attemptwas made to
compute the targetsfor the terminalphase initiation(TI) maneuver. As a
result of this software problem, the TI maneuverwas delayedone revolution,and
Mission ControlCenter (MCC) computed targetswere uplinked for the remainderof
the rendezvousactivitiesduring the mission.
The third EVA, the first EVA ever performedwith three EVA crew members,was
performedon flightday 7 beginningwith hatch openingat 134:21:06G.m.t.
(05:21:26MET), and lastingfor 8 hours 32 minutes. Manual INTELSATsatellite
capturewas completedat 134:23:55G.m.t. (06:00:15MET). The capturebar was
attached and nominalsatelliteberthingactivitiesbegan. The perigeekick
motor was successfullyattachedand the satellitewas deployed at
135:04:53G.m.t. (06:05:13MET). After the INTELSATdeployment,EV2 cleanedup
the payload bay and returned to the airlock, after which airlock
f repressurizationwas initiatedat 135:05:42G.m.t. (06:06:02MET) and completed
nine minutes later.
As a result of the additionalEVA's required to capture the INTELSAT satellite,
the MissionManagementTeam (MMT) made the decisionon the morning of flight
day 7 to extend the mission48 hours with landing to occur on Saturday,
May 16, 1992, insteadof Thursday,May 14, 1992.
The fourth EVA, which had a durationof 7 hours 43 minutes,was successfully
completedon flight day 8, and limitedASEM activitieswere performed. Airlock
depressurizationwas initiatedat 135:20:54G.m.t. (06:21:14MET) with airlock
egress occurring36 minutes later at 06:21:50MET.
Immediatelyfollowingthe selectionof batterypower by the EV3 crew person,a
continuous"POWER RESTART" messagewas shown on the EMU DCM display. The EV3
crew person was instructedto return to the SCU power while an assessmentof the
conditionwas made. All real-timedata received from the EMU showed that EMU
performancewas nominal. Based on the capabilityto monitorEMU performanceon
the ground, the decisionwas made to continue the EVA. Suit performance
remainednominal throughoutthe EVA.
In addition to the ASEM and crew member propulsivedevice (CPD) evaluation,EVA
crew members manually stowed the malfunctioningKu-band antenna. The
over-the-noseEVA operationswere not performeddue to time limitations.
Airlock repressurizationbegan at 136:04:52G.m.t. (07:05:12MET).
The STS-49missionwith its fourEVA'shad a totalof 25 hours27 minutesof EVA
timeand a totalpersonhoursof 59 hours26 minutesin theEVA environment. _-_
The thirdEVA was not only the longestin historyat 8 hours32 minutes,but
also the firstEVA with threepeopleoutsidethe cabinenvironment.The fourth
EVA was theone-hundredthEVA in recordedhistoryof mannedflight.
RCS primarythrusterL4L failedleakat 136:18:23:06G.m.t.(07:18:43:06MET),
immediatelyaftertheRCS hot-firetest. Approximately1 hour 45 minutesafter
the leakindication,the fueland oxidizerinjectortemperaturesrose,
indicatingthat theleakstopped. Duringentry,thrusterL4L operatedproperly
duringtheroll reversalmaneuverand theleak indicationdid not recur.
Flightcontrolsystems(FCS)checkoutwas performedat 136:18:37:59G.m.t.
(07:18:57:59MET) usingAPU 2. All systemparameterswere nominalduringthe
6-minute19.6-secondrun. Approximately15 ib of fuelwere consumed.
The RCS interconnectoperationswith theOMS was discontinued(crossfeedvalves
closed)at approximately136:15:34G.m.t.(07:15:54MET). The OMS propellant
quantitieswerenear theminimumredlinesof 30.7 percentfor the deorbit
maneuver. The totalRCS interconnectusagefor themissionwas 13.04percent
from the leftOMS and 12.94percentfrom therightOMS.
Bothpayloadbay doorswere closedby 137:17:37:55G.m.t.(08:17:57:55MET);
however,duringthe portdoor closure,theaft bulkheadlatchindicationsfailed
to indicatelatched. The latchesweredrivento the releasedpositionin the
nominaldual motordrivetimeof 24 seconds. The latcheswere thendrivento
the latchedposition,and a currentspikewas noted20 secondsinto the
operation,indicatingtheexistenceof some typeof obstruction.The portaft
bulkheadlatchindicationsneveroccurred,but the remainingbulkheadand
centerlinelatcheslatchedand the indicationswerenominal. Underthe flight
rules,entrycan be performedwith one latchgangunlatched;however,entryload
minimizationtechniqueswere implementedin accordancewith the flightrules.
The deorbitmaneuverwas performedat 137:19:55:14.9G.m.t.(08:20:15:14.9MET).
The maneuverwas approximately167.5secondsin durationand resultedin a
differentialvelocityof 314.3ft/sec. Entryinterfaceoccurredat
137:20:27:03G.m.t.(08:20:47:03MET).
Main landinggear touchdownoccurredat EdwardsAir ForceBase.CA, on concrete
runway22 at 137:20:57:38G.m.t.(08:21:17:38MET)on May 16, 1992. Nose
landinggear touchdownoccurredI0 secondslaterwithwheelsstopat
137:20:58:34G.m.t. Preliminaryindicationsare thatthe rolloutwas normalin
all respects. The drag chutewas deployedimmediatelyfollowingnosegear
touchdownand was jettisonedat 137:20:58:17.4G.m.t. The flightdurationwas
8 days 21 hours17 minutes38 seconds. The APU'swere shutdownby
137:21:11:46.77G.m.t. The crewcompletedthe requiredpostflight
reconfigurationsand departedtheOrbiterlandingareaat 137:22:02G.m.t.
(3:02p.m.P.d.t.)
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VEHICLEPERFORMANCE
An evaluationof vehicleascentperformancewasmadeusingvehicleacceleration
and preflightpropulsionpredictiondata. From these data, the average
- flight-derivedengine specific impulse (Isp) determinedfor the time period
• betweenSRB separationand start of 3g throttlingwas 452.17 seconds.
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER/REDESIGNEDSOLID ROCKET MOTOR
All SRB systems performedas designed. The SRB prelaunchcountdownwas normal,
and no SRB or RSRM in-flightanomalieswere identified. Likewise,no SRB or
RSRM LCC or 0perationsand MaintenanceRequirementsand SpecificationsDocument
(OMRSD)violationsoccurred.
Power up and operationof all case, igniter,and field joint heaters was
successfullyaccomplished. All heaters performednominally,even though four
interimproblem reports (IPR's)were written on ground support equipment(GSE)
that affectedRSRM heater and sensor circuits. These IPR's were as follows:
I. Left igniterheater temperaturedropped 20 °F when power was applied;
2. Heater controllerfailed to cycle at the 100 °F setpoint;
3. Secondarypower supply for right RSRM joint heaters providedhigh
voltage (235 Vac); and
: 4. Gaseous nitrogen (GN2) purge heater controllerfailed.
None of these problemshad any effect on the performanceof the RSRM heaters.
All RSRM temperatureswere maintainedwithin acceptablelimits throughoutthe
countdown. For this flight, the heated ground purge in the SRB aft skirt was
poweredup and the case/jointand flexiblebearing temperatureswere maintained
within the required LCC ranges.
The RSRM propulsionperformancewas well within the required specification
limits,and the propellantburn rate for each RSRM was normal as shown in the
table on the followingpage. RSRM thrust differentialsduring the buildup,
steady state, and tailoffphaseswere well within specifications. All SRB
thrust vector controlprelaunchconditionsand flight performancerequirements
were met with ample margins. All electricalfunctionswere performedproperly.
The SRB flight structural temperatureresponsewas as expected. Postflight
inspectionof the recoveredhardware indicatedthat the SRB thermalprotection
system (TPS) performedproperlyduring ascent with very little TPS ablation.
Both SRB's were successfullyseparatedfrom the ET at lift-offplus
127.1 seconds. Separationsubsystemperformancewas normal with all booster
separationmotors expendedand all separationbolts severed. Nose cap jettison,
frustumseparation,and nozzle extensionjettison occurrednormally on each SRB.
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RSRM PROPULSIONPERFORMANCE ..... -
Parameter Leftmotor,69 °F Rightmotor,69 °F
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
Impulsega_es
1-20,I0_ ibf-sec 64.47 64.38 64.58 64.26
1-60,I0_ Ibf-sec 172.39 171.81 172.64 171.49
I-AT,I00 Ibf-sec 296.78 296.69 296.77 296.17
VacuumIsp, ibf-sec/ibm 268.5 268.2 268.5 267.8
Burn rate,in/sec 0.3647 0.3643 0.3651 0.3641
Eventtimes,seconds
Ignitioninterval 0.232 N/A 0.232 N/A
Web time 111.7 111.5 111.5 112.0
Actiontime 123.7 124.4 123.5 123.8
Separationcue,50 psia 121.6 122.1 121.3 121.7
PMBT,°F 69.0 69.0 69.0 69.0
Maximumignitionrise rate, 90.4 N/A 90.4 N/A
psia/10ms
Decaytime,seconds 2.8 3.1 2.8 2.9
(59.4psia to 85 K)
Tailoffimbalance Predicted Actual
Impulsedifferential, N/A 588.4
klbf-sec
The entryand decelerationsequencewas properlyperformedon both SRB's. RSRM
nozzle-extensionjettisonoccurredafterfrustumseparation,and subsequent
parachutedeploymentswere successfullyperformedwith two problemsidentified:
a. The rightfrustumbipodstrutclevisbracketsand main parachute
supportstructure(MPSS)leg C were damaged;and
b. The rightmain parachuteno. 3 10-secondreefingline cutter
failedto fire.
These problems did not affect recovery system performance and are not considered
to be in-flight anomalies.
The SRB's were returned to port at Cape Canaveral where disassembly and shipment
to refurbishment facilities occurred.
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EXTERNALTANK
ET flight performancewas excellent. All objectivesand requirementsassociated
with the ET propellantloadingand flight operationswere met. All ET
electricalequipmentand instrumentationperformedsatisfactorily. ET purge and
heater operationswere monitoredand all performedproperly. No LCC or OHRSD
violationswere identified.
As expected,only the normal ice/frostformationsfor the Hay atmospheric
environmentwere observedduring the countdown. There was no frost or ice on
the acreage areas of the ET. Normal quantitiesof ice or frost were presenton
the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen feedlinesand on the pressurizationline
brackets. A small amount of frost was also presentalong the edge of the liquid
hydrogen protuberanceair load (PAL) ramps. All of these observationswere
acceptablebased on NSTS 08303, the officialSpace Shuttledocument for these
conditions.
The ET pressurizationsystem functionedproperly throughoutengine start and
flight. The minimum liquid oxygen ullage pressureexperiencedduring the period
of the ullage pressureslump was 14.3 psid.
As usual, the ET tumble systemwas deactivatedfor this flight;radar data from
Bermuda confirmedthat the ET did not tumbleafter ET/Orbiterseparation. ET
separationwas confirmedto have occurredproperly,and based on the HECO time,
ET entry and breakupoccurredwithin the expected footprint. There were no
significantET problemsidentified.
SPACE SBUTTLEMAIN ENGINE
All prelaunchoperationsassociatedwith the SSHE's were executed successfully.
Launch GSE provided adequatecontrolfor the SSHE's during launch preparation.
All SSHE parameterswere normal throughoutthe prelaunchcountdownand compared
well with expectedvalues for this hardware. Engine ready was achievedat the
proper time, all LCC were met, and engine start and thrust buildupwere normal.
Flight data indicatethat the SSME performanceduring mainstage, throttling,
shutdown,and propellantdump operationswas normal. All three enginesstarted
and operatednormally. High-pressureoxidizer turbopump(HPOTP)and
high-pressurefuel turbopump(BPFTP)temperatureswere normal throughoutthe
period of engine operationwith the exceptionof a disqualificationfailureof
the high pressurefuel turbinedischargechannelB temperaturesensor at
approximatelylift-offplus 93 secondson SSHE 2. The sensor has been delivered
to the vendor for failureanalysis. Engine operationremainednormal following
the failure,and no other significantSSHE problemswere identified.
Analysis of the STS-49data indicatesthe occurrenceof two "pops". A "pop"
occurredon SSHE-2at cutoff plus 3.15 secondsand measured 55g peak-to-peakat
the gimbal bearing. The amplitudeand time of occurrenceindicatesthat the
"pop" could have originatedfrom either the main combustionchamber, fuel
preburner,or oxidizer preburner. A "pop" also occurred on SSHE-3 at engine
start plus 1.16 secondsand measured llSg peak-to-peakat the gimbal bearing.
The amplitudeand time of occurrenceindicatesthat the "pop" could have
originatedfrom either the main combustionchamber or the fuel preburner. ----_
However, neither of these possible oxidizerpreburner"pops" were large enough
to requireinspectionof the faceplate.
In addition, there were nine responsesat approximatelycutoff plus 1.7 seconds,
indicatingthe occurrenceof an event during the shutdown transientof SSME-2.
The nine responsesobserved on the SSME-2gimbal bearingaccelerometersranged
in amplitudefrom 55g to 65g peak-to-peak. The responseswere periodic and
occurredapproximately0.012 second apart. The phenomenonhas been observed
previouslyand reported in postflightdata reviews. In every incident, the
phenomenonhas occurredduring the shutdown transientbetween approximately
cutoff plus 1.7 and 1.8 seconds and is only observedon the gimbal bearing
accelerometers,indicatingthat it probably originatedfrom the main combustion
chamber and not from the oxidizer or fuel preburners.
Postflight inspectionsrevealed bluing of the aft manifold on SSME-3 (Flight
Problem STS-49-I-02). Similaraft manifoldbluing was noted on one SSME on
STS-33 and STS-36,and it was determinedthat this bluing was caused by heating
that occurred during entry. An insulationupgrade on the engine nozzle was
basellned for STS-33 to prevent bluing. In addition, the Orbiter elevonlbody
flap scheduleswere revised to eliminatethe heating source to the aft manifold.
This problemwas a re-flightissue, but was not a constraintto the next flight,
STS-50. The entry profileswere assessed to determinepossible causes for this
heating. Hardness checks were performedto verify the integrityof the aft
manifold.
The SSME controllersprovided the proper controlof the engines throughout _--_.
powered flight. Engine dynamicdata generallycomparedwell with previous
flight and test data. All on-orbitactivitiesassociatedwith the SSME's were
accomplishedsuccessfully.
SHUTTLERANGE SAFETY SYSTEM
The Shuttle range safety system (SRSS) operatednominally throughoutthe launch
phase. SRSS closed-looptestingwas completedas scheduledduring the launch
countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) deviceswere armed and system inhibits
turned off at the appropriatetimes. All SRSS measurementsindicated that the
system performanceand signal strengthwere as expected throughoutthe launch
phase.
Prior to SRB separation,the SRB S&A deviceswere safed, and SRB system power
was turned off as planned. The ET system remainedactive until ET separation
from the Orbiter.
A data "spike" was seen on the ET RSS Arm Command measurement 285 seconds after
lift-off. There were no RSS arm/fire signals transmitted from the Range Safety
Officer. The conclusion reached through the subsequent investigation was that
this spike was a spurious data point and not a response from the RSS. This fact
is supported by the last data update received from JSC, which does not contain
the spike. Furthermore, if this had been a real response from the IRD, the
pyrotechnic initiator controller (PIC) voltage would have increased. The PIC
voltage showed no increase, therefore this was a spurious data spike. The
conclusionwas basedon a reviewof theRSS hardware/system.Also,theIRD and _-_
theRSShavecircuitsin placetoprotectagainst spuriousresponses. In-flight
anomaly STS-49-I-04was opened for this anomalyand immediatelyclosed by
Systems Integrationpersonnelas an explainedcondition.
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMPERFORMANCE
. On this first flight of Endeavour(OV-105),the Orbiterperformancewas
satisfactory. Although 36 anomalieswere identified,none of the anomalieswere
of such concern as to potentiallycause a shortenedmission. In fact, the
mission was lengthened two days to complete the plannedactivities.
Main PropulsionSTstem
The overallperformanceof the MPS was excellent. All pretankingpurges were
properlyperformedand liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen loadingwas completed
satisfactorilywith no stop-flowsor reverts. The MPS helium system also
performedsatisfactorily. No LCC or OMRSD violationswere noted.
Throughout the preflightoperations,no significanthazardousgas concentrations
were detected,and the maximumhydrogen concentrationin the Orbiter aft
compartmentwas 324 ppm, which compareswell with the experiencebase for this
Orbiter that was establishedduring the FRF. The aft compartmenthelium
concentrationpeaked at 5,580 ppm, and the aft compartmentoxygen concentration
remainedat 0 ppm.
A comparisonof the calculatedpropellantloads at the end of replenishversus
o the inventoryloads resultedin a loadingaccuracyof +0.029 percent for liquid
hydrogen and +0.031 percentfor liquid oxygen.
Ascent MPS performancewas normal. Data indicate that the liquid oxygen and
liquid hydrogen pressurizationsystemsperformedas planned,and that all net
positive suction pressure (NPSP) requirementswere met throughoutthe flight.
Space Shuttlemain engine cutoff occurred at lift-offplus 509.4 seconds.
Liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen propellantconditionswere within specified
limits during all phases of operation.
The gaseous oxygen pressurizationsystem performednormally throughoutthe
flight. The gaseous oxygen flow controlvalves were shimmedto a target
position correspondingto a 77.6-percentflow area for 0V-105. The minimum
ullage pressure experiencedduring the period of ullage pressureslump was
14.3 psid. Propellantdump and vacuum inertingwere accomplished
satisfactorily.
. Ullage pressureswere maintainedwithin the requiredlimits throughoutthe
flight. Feed system performancewas nominal;however, at approximatelylift-off
plus 55 seconds, after SSME throttleup to 104 percent, the SSME-2 liquid
hydrogen inlet pressuremeasurement(V41TI200C)ceased trackingthe other two
engine inlet pressuresand the liquid hydrogenmanifold pressure. The SSME-2
measurementdropped 3 psi while the other three measurementsrose approximately
3 psi (FlightProblem STS-49-V-13). From 2 minutes40 seconds to 4 minutes, the
SSME I liquid hydrogen inlet pressuresteadilydecreaseda total of 3.5 psi.
_ SSME-3 inlet pressurewas within the spread of the last three Orbiters'data.
Tentative rationales for these observations include bias/shifting of the
pressuretransducers,calibrationcurveinaccuracies,or contaminationof the _
prevalvescreens.
The STS-49missionwas the firstflightuse of the -0006750-psihelium
regulatorsand the -0006850-psiheliumreliefvalves. The regulators howeda
slowerresponseto flowdemandthan the-0005regulators,but no problemswere
detected.The reliefvalveswereneveroperatedduringthe mission. STS-49was
also the firstflightof theliquidhydrogenET/Orbiterumbilicalspacer
modification,and no problemswere identifiedconcerningthismodification.
ReactionControlSubsTstem
The RCS performednominallythroughouthemission,exceptfor the two anomalies
discussedin the followingparagraphs.Twenty-fourmajorRCS maneuverswere
performedin additionto the normalattitudemaneuvers.Propellantconsumption
from the forwardRCS modulewas 2067.4ib, consumptionfrom theleftRCS module
was 1737.4ib, and consumptionfrom the rightRCS modulewas 1747.1lb. In
addition,1689Ib (13.04percent)was used from theleftOHS moduleand
1676 ib (12.94percent)was used fromthe rightOMS moduleduringRCS
interconnectoperations.Priorto thedeorbitmaneuver,a decisionwas madenot
to performDTO 249 (ForwardRCS FlightTest 12-SecondPulse)becauseof
insufficientforwardRCS propellantremainingfor use duringthe entryphase.
The RCS thrusterF4R heaterwas notedto be failed-onwhen the heaterswitches
were positionedto on duringtheprelaunchcountdown(FlightProblem
STS-49-V-01).Reviewof the FRF datarevealedthat the failureoccurred _--_
approximately2 hoursafterthe firing. Consequently,thrusterF4R was
reprioritizedto lastpriorityto precludefiringthe thruster.The F4R heater
was manuallycycled,and the thrustertemperatureswere maintainedwithinthe
desiredlimitsof 60 °F and 170 °F. Poweringthe heateron and off also
affectedthrusterF4D becausethe heaterswitchis commonto F4R. Powercannot
be removedfromone withoutremovingit fromthe other. On orbit,the F4RRCS
thrusterinjectortemperaturesreacheda maximumof 169 °F. The F4D injector
temperaturesneverfellbelow60 °F whiletheheaterswere poweredoff.
The RCS operatednominallyduringrendezvousoperations.PrimarythrustersL3A
and R3A injectortemperaturesreached170 °F duringrendezvousoperations.
However,subsequentfiringtimeswere greaterthan0.5 second;thus,thevalve
seatsshouldhave beenless than150 °F when thevalvescloseddue to the
coolingeffectof flowingpropellant.In addition,slightlydegradedchamber
pressures(Pc)were observedon vernierRSD. This signatureis consistentwith
past flighthistoryand can be attributedto a build-upof ironnitratein the
oxidizervalvetrimorificeor build-upof combustionresiduein thePc sense
tube. In eithercase,the build-upwas clearedwhen the thrusterwas firedfor
longerdurations.
RCS primarythrusterL4L failedleakat 136:18:23:06G.m.t.(07:18:43:06MET),
about30 secondsaftertheRCS hot-firetest(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-18).The
oxidizervalvetemperaturedroppedto approximately18 °F_and the fuelvalve
temperaturedroppedto 48 °F at its lowestpoint. Approximately1 hour45
minutesafterthe leak indication,thefueland oxidizerinjectortemperatures _-_
returnedto normalvalues,indicatingthatthe leakstopped. The priorityof
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this thrusterwas changedfrom third to last in the priority table. During
_ entry, thrusterL4L operated properlyon the three occasionsit was used during
the roll reversalmaneuver and the leak did not recur.
OrbitalManeuveringSubsystem
The OMS performedsatisfactorilywith no anomaliesidentified. A total of nine
OMS maneuverswas performedduring the mission,with a total of 382.54 seconds
of firing on the left engine and 388.56 secondsof firing on the right engine.
Six starts were made on each engine. Three of the maneuverswere dual-engine
" firingsand the remainingsix were single-enginefirings.
The RCS interconnectoperationswith the OMS were discontinued(crossfeedvalves
closed)at approximately136:15:34G.m.t. (07:15:54MET). The 0MS propellant
quantitieswere near the minimumredlinesof 30.7 percentfor the deorbit
maneuver. The total RCS interconnectusage for the missionwas 13.04 percent
from the left OMS and 12.94 percentfrom the right OMS.
Power Reactant Storageand DistributionSubsystem
The PRSD performancewas nominal. A total of 244.6 Ib of hydrogenwas consumed
from the four-tank-setconfiguration,and a total of 2054.1 ib of oxygen was
consumedof which 112 Ib was used by the crew. An 87.6-hourmission extension
at the average power level was possiblewith the reactantsremainingat landing.
The oxygen manifold isolationvalve 1 failed to close when commandedand
f remained open for the duration of the mission (FlightProblem STS-49-V-02). The
: valve is used only for leak isolationin the plumbing. On flight day 9, the
crew was requestedto cycle the PRSD oxygen manifold 1 isolationvalve to close
in an attempt to regain the valve's capability. The switch was taken to close
and held; however, the-valveremainedopen. The open valve did not impact
missionoperations.
The crew attempted to close the manifoldvalve twice on flightday I, but
without success. The pressure in the PRSD oxygenmanifold spiked to 989 psia at
129:19:58:30G.m.t. (00:20:18:30MET). The depressurizationof the cabin was
completedat the same time. Cabin depressurizationcauses high flow from the
oxygen cryogenictanks. When the high flow demand was stopped,a pressure spike
in the manifold developedas the fluid trappeddownstreamof the tank check
valve warmed. The manifold relief valves opened to relieve the manifold
pressure to either tank 1 or 2 or both tanks 1 and 2. Oxygen tank 1 experienced
a 30-psi pressure rise and oxygen tank 2 experienceda 2-psi pressure rise.
This conditionrepeatedseveral times during cabin pressuremaintenanceat
10.2 psi.
Fuel Cell PowerplantSubsystem
The fuel cell powerplantsubsystemperformancewas nominal throughoutthe
mission with a total of 2877.6kwh of electricalenergyat an averagepower
level of 13.49 kW supplied for Orbiterand payloadoperations. A total of
244.6 Ib of hydrogen and 1942.1 ib of oxygenwas used, and 2186.7 ib of water
was produced. The averageOrbiterelectricalload was 432 amperes.
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AuxiliaryPowerUnit Subsystem _-_
The APU performancewas nominalthroughout hemission. ThreeAPU in-flight
anomalieswere noted,but noneof theseimpactedthe satisfactorycompletionof
themission.
IAPU 1 (S/N303) IAPU2 (S/N401) IAPU 3 (S/N207)
FlightPhase Time, Fuel Time, Fuel Time, Fuel
min:sec consumption,min:sec consumption,min:sec consumption,
Ib ib ib
Ascent 19:46 47 19:46 48 19:46 49
FCS checkout 06:20 15
Entry£ 81:25 151 57:31 113 57:31 113
Totala I01:ii 198 83:37 176 77:17 162
aThe APU'swereoperatedfor 14 minutes7 secondsafterlandingand a nominal
hydraulicload testwas performed uringthat time.
Duringand aftercryogenicsloading,theAPU 3 fuel testline temperature2
violatedthe lowerLCC limitof 48 °F (FlightProblemSTS-49-V-33).The heater
cycledto lowsof 47 °F. Sincetheheaterwas operatingnormallywith constant
heatercycles,an LCC waiverfor thisconditionwas approved. Afterascent,the
heaterswere activatedand all temperatureswere nominal.
The APU 3 gearboxgaseousnitrogenpressureand lubricationoil outletpressure _-_
were lowerthannormalthroughoutentry(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-25).The
lubricationoil outletpressurereached27 psia,but did not reachthe fault
detectionand annunciation(FDA)limitof 25 psia. At the same time,the
gearboxpressuredecreasedslowlyto a low pointof 6 psia. Bothpressure
measurementsindicatederraticlubricationoil operationduringthislow
pressureperiod. Althoughthegearboxpressurewas low,no limitswere violated
and the pressuredid not becomelow enoughto activatethegearbox
repressurizationsystem. The lubricationoil systemperformednominallywith
normalgearboxpressuresduringascentand showedadequatelubricationoil flow
duringentry.
The APU 1 injectortubetemperaturemeasurementbecameerraticjust priorto APU
shutdownafterlandingand the temperaturesuddenlydroppedfrom 1350 °F to
750 °F afterAPU shutdown(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-26).The temperaturethen
beganto slowlydecreasefor about1 hour 25 minutes,and then the temperature
suddenlyincreased300 °F to thenormallyexpectedlevel.
Hydraulics/WaterSprayBoilerSubsystem
The watersprayboiler(WSB)performancewas nominalthroughout hemission.
The WSB 2 regulatoroutletpressuresensordid not immediatelyrespondto relief
valvecrackand reseat(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-09)duringascent. The sensor
apparentlyhungup for one minuteand thenrecovered.This samebehaviorwas
notedon the STS-44and STS-45(OV-I04)flights. The sensorwas removedand
replacedduringpostflight urnaroundactivities.
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During this flight, the brake isolationvalves remainedclosed throughoutthe
t_"_ on-orbitperiod. The valves are normally opened for thermalconditioning,but
the fluid in this area rarely gets cold enough to warrant heating. Also, a
possibilityexists that the brake isolationvalve could become stuck in the open
position,which would lead to uncommandedbrake pressuresduring usage. As a
result, the decision was made to leave the valves closed during the on-orbit
period unless thermalconditioningwas required.
During entry, the thrustvector controlisolationvalves cycled for engine
positioningin preparationfor the drag chute deployment. Also, the new landing
gear isolationvalve performedas expected. The brake isolationvalves opened
nominallyat touchdownas part of the uncommandedbrake pressuremodification.
ElectricalPower Distributionand Control Subsystem
At 135:06:58:24G.m.t. (06:07:18:24MET), a two-second2.5-ampereincreasewas
noted on ac bus 2 phase B. At the same time, a shorter two-ampereincreasewas
noted on ac bus 2 phase C, and a slight increasewas also noted on phase A.
Analysis of the waveform showed it to be typicalof a two-phasemotor start-up
with a stall to single-phaseoperation. Status bits indicatedthat no equipment
from any of the motor controlassemblieswas operatingat that time.
Furthermore,all environmentalcontroland fuel cell equipmentwhich operates
directlyoff the ac busses was operatingnominallyduring the time of the
waveform. The only candidateload left was the crew seats. The waveform could
have resulted from an inadvertentoperationof the crew seat positionswitch
with the switch not fully actuated (i.e.,all three contactsclosed). However,
since the crew seats do not have switch scan instrumentation,it cannot be
conclusivelyshown that this hypothesisis correct.
PyrotechnicsSubsystem
All pyrotechnicdevices associatedwith the vehicle operationsperformed
nominally. The drag parachutemortar and retractorperformedas expectedwith
deploymentand jettison of the drag parachutebeing nominal.
EnvironmentalControland Life SupportSubsystem
The atmosphericrevitalizationsubsystem(ARS) air and water coolantloop
performancewas nominal,and the carbon dioxidepartialpressurewas maintained
below 5.4 mm Hg. The cabin air temperatureand relativehumidity peaked at
83 °F and 36.7 percent, respectively. The avionicsbay I, 2, and 3 air outlet
temperaturespeaked at 104.5 °F, 105 °F, and 90.75 °F, respectively. The
avionics bays I, 2, and 3 water coldplatetemperaturespeaked at 87.5 °F,
90.5 °F, and 81.5 °F, respectively.
After HECO, the avionics bay 3 AP exceeded the upper limit of 4.3 inches of
water while operatingon fan B (FlightProblem STS-49-V-08). Fan A was
activatedand the !_Pwas higher than on fan B. Fan B was reactivated. The crew
cleaned the filtersand found no debris on the fan inlet and cautionand warning
unit inlet filters. However, the GPC 3 inlet filterwas 20 percent coveredby
lint, which was removed. Also, an in-flightmaintenance(IFH) procedurewas
performed to remove debris from the TACAN orifice filter in an unsuccessfulf--
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attempt to reduce the fan _P. The _P remainedhigh (3.22 at 10.2 psia), but
avionics bay 3 temperaturesremainedwithin acceptablelimits throughoutthe _
flight.
The cabin dp/dt sensor exhibiteda slower response than expected to cabin
pressure changes throughoutthe mission. The cabin dp/dt sensor was 2 to 5
times slower than typicallyseen (FlightProblem STS-49-V-16).
Cabin depressurizationto 10.2 psiawassuccessfullycompletedat
129:19:00G.m.t. (00:19:20MET) in preparationfor the plannedEVA's. During
cabin depressurization,no oxygen flow registeredon the system 2 oxygen flow
sensor (FlightProblem STS-49-V-04). Data analysis confirmedoxygen was
flowing; therefore,the sensor was failed. This failuredid not impact the
mission.
Manualpressurecontrolwas usedas the primarymeansof cabinpressurecontrol
becauseof the 10.2-psiacabinpressure.Automaticcabinpressurecontrolwas
used the last day of themissionwhen the cabinpressurewas at 14.7 psia. A
newlyredesignedoxygenpartialpressuresensor(positionC) was flownon OV-105
and its operationwas nominalthroughouthemission.
The pressurecontrolsystem(PCS)1 nitrogenflowmeterdata signaturewas
off-nominalduringcabinrepressurization(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-24).Data
analysiscontinuesto determinethe causeof theoff-nominalindication.
The activethermalcontrolsystemoperationwas nominalwith threeFES shutdowns
due to reducedwaterpressureat the lO.2-psiacabinpressure.The shutdowns
occurredat thestart-upof theFES waterdumps. Theseare expectedat the
lO.2-psiacabinpressureusingthepresentprocedures.A crewprocedurechange
is beingconsideredto precludetheseshutdownsat 10.2psia.
Smalltransienttemperatureoscillationswere notedin the FES outlet
temperatureduringascent(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-IO).Also,theFES
accumulator/high-loadlineheateron system1 operatedabovethecontrol
temperatureand did not cycle(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-03).The high-loadline
temperaturewent off-scalehigh (>250°F)at 1 hour40 minutesMET and remained
high untilsystem2 was selected. System2 operatednominallyfor the remainder
of themission.
The supply water and waste managementsystems performednominally throughoutthe
mission. By the completionof the mission, all of the associatedin-flight
checkoutrequirementswere performedand satisfied.
Supply water was managed throughthe use of the overboarddump system and the
FES. Two supply water dumps _ere performedat an average dump rate of
I,._8per_.ent/minute(Z.2_ Ib/min). All dumps were performedat lO.2-psiacabin
j_,_msalxL-e.The supply water dump line temperaturewas maintainedbetween 68 "F
and 103 °F throughoutthe missionwith the operationof the line heater.
Three waste water dumps were performedat an averagedump rate of 1.8-percent
per minute (2.97 ib/min). All dumps were performedat 10.2-psiacabin pressure.
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The waste water dump line temperaturewas maintainedbetween 53 °F and 80 °F
_ throughoutthe mission,while the vacuum vent line temperaturewas between 57 °F
and 82 OF.
The first dump of the supplywater and waste water systemswas performed
simultaneouslyas a part of DTO 325. The dump nozzleswere viewed with the RMS
camera throughoutthe dump. Supply tank B was emptied to I0 percentand the
waste tank was emptied to 5.29 percent. During bake-out of the supply nozzle,a
temperaturedrop and subsequentsluggishrecoveryoccurred for approximately3
minutes. This conditionwas most likely due to the "popcorn"effect of water as
it exits the nozzle at dump termination. A subsequentnozzle bake-outwas
performedwith a nominal profile.
The waste collectionsystem (WCS) operationwas acceptable. In addition to the
normal WCS operations,the fan separatorwas also used throughoutthe mission to
drain the EMU's and purge the personalhygiene stationhose so that hot water
could be deliveredto the crew members. On flight day 8 during entry
preparations,the WCS fan separator1 failed to reach the nominal operational
speed (FlightProblem STS-49-V-21). The crew reportedduring postflight
debriefingsthat at the time of the failurewhen the WCS fan separator1 was
activated, the crew was able to hear the microswitchoperate, but fan operation
did not follow. The ac 1 bus current trace indicatedonly the stall current,an
indication that the separatordid not attain the nominalspeed and was possibly
flooded. The crew switched to fan separator2 which operated nominally.
A redesign of the fan separatoris currentlybeing developed that will make the
/_ fan separatorless likely to flood in flight. The design improvementsincludea
redesignedbowl with dividers to preventsplashingand liquid bypass,and a
delayed shutdownmechanism to ensure that all liquid is pumped out prior to
shutdown.
The cabin humidity sensor did not respondas anticipatedthroughoutthe mission
(FlightProblem STS-49-V-20). Also, during the postlandingoperations,the
humidity indicationremainedat 30.8 percent, but was expected to indicateabove
50 percent.
Smoke Detectionand Fire SuppressionSubsystem
All smoke detectionsensors indicatednormal performancethroughoutthe mission,
and the use of the fire suppressionsystemwas not required.
Airlock SupportSubsystem
The airlock supportsystem operatednominallyin support of the first mission
. during which four EVA's were performed,includingthe first three-crew-member
EVA.
Avionics and Software Subsystems
At T-29 minutes in the launch countdown,a transientmaster events controller
(MEC) 2 Fire 2/Fire 3 commandbuilt-in test equipment(BITE) bit was found to be
set (FlightProblem STS-49-V-05). Two subsequentpreflightBITE reads were
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performed and the bit was 0 (no failure indicated). Analysis of this occurrence
revealed no concerns for flying as-is since the BITE was not a hard failure, and ......
was most likely a intermittent BITE failure of the MEC. In addition, the
failure would most likely affect only one core of MEC 2 and the remaining core
in MEC 2 as well as both cores in MEC 1 provided adequate redundancy to perform
all MEC functions even if this were a hard failure.
During the third rendezvous with the INTELSAT, the fault message "TGT ITER 12"
was unexpectedly annunciated when the attempt was made to compute the targets
for the TI maneuver onboard (Flight Problem STS-49-V-14). The crew was able to
cause the annunciation to recur, even after a reload of the initial loads from
the mass memory unit (MMU). Ten targeting attempts were made, five of which
were successful. A GPC dump was performed and the data were as expected,
indicating no hardware failure. As a result of this software problem, the TI
maneuver was delayed one revolution and MCC-computed targets were uplinked for
the remainder of the rendezvous activities throughout the mission.
Analysis determined conclusively that the targeting convergence failure
experienced prior to the third rendezvous was due solely to mixed-precision
calculations in the Lambert guidance algorithms. Subsequent analysis of the
results of tests run on the double precision MIDVAL library routine and
associated double precision microcode indicated an additional, unrelated problem
in the APIOI/S microcode (firmware). The compare extended data (CED) and
compare extended data register (CEDR) will return a value of equal when the
operands are not equal (Flight Problem STS-49-V-23). However, audits of the
software revealed that the insignificant differences in the operands that result
in the false equal-condition are such that the software is unaffected. In other _--_
words, the numbers are "equal enough" to allow proper performance of the
software.
Postflight testinguncoveredanothermicrocodeinstructionthat returnsa wrong
value in some cases. The divide extendeddata register (DEDR)will return an
incorrectquotientwhen dividing two numbers in some cases. However, once
again, the number returned is close enough for the purposes involved. The
difference between the correctanswer and the returnedanswer is insignificant.
None of the three instructions(CED, CEDR, and DEDR) mentionedwere used on the
API01B machines, thus complicatingthe testingthat had previouslybeen done on
APIOIS machines. Software for STS-50, the flight after STS-49,has been
audited, and there were no impacts. The problemhas been closed,with audits
being required for future OI's and any patches to 01-21. Other microcode
instructionsthat were not used on the API01B machineswill also be thoroughly
tested. Four additional instructionshave not as yet been used in the software
code; consequently,no software audits will be made.
While the crew was making entries to the GNC 201 display,cathode ray tube (CRT)
1 BITE was annunciatedby GPC's 1 and 2 (FlightProblemSTS-49-V-19). The crew
performeda malfunctionprocedureand CRT 1 operationwas recovered.
Communicationsand Tracking SubsTstem
The performanceof the communicationsand trackingsubsystemwas acceptablewith
several anomalies recorded. The Ku-bandcommunicationsperformancewas nominal _-_
until the occurrenceof the pointingfailure,which is discussedin the
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followingparagraph.The Ku-bandradarperformancewas exceptionalduringeach
_ INTELSATrendezvous.The textand graphicssystem(TAGS)operatedverywell
with one jam whichthecrewquicklyclearedand theTAGSoperatednominallyfor
the remainderof themission. A totalof 313 pageswere successfulreceived,
and 50 of thesewere transmitteduringan endurancetestto determinewhether
thatmany pagescouldbe loadedinto the traywithouta jam.
At 135:17:00G.m.t.(06:17:20MET),theKu-bandantennalostits pointing
capabilitywith the telemetrypointingdatadisagreeingwith theactualantenna
pointingangles(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-15).In addition,aftermany steering
" mode changes,an oscillationof the antennaoccurred.The oscillationwas
similarto thatobservedon STS-41Gin whichtheBetaaxiswas frozenand the
Alphaaxiswas performingnominally.As a resultof theantennaproblems,the
antennawas stowedat 136:00:09G.m.t.(07:00:29MET) usingan IFM procedure
developedfor STS-41Gby whichan extravehicularcrewpersonmanuallypointed
the antennato the lockposition,and themiddeckcrewpersonbypassedthe
electronicsassemblyand poweredthelockmotorsto lock thegimbals. The EV3
crewperson,whilemanuallypointingtheantenna,reporteda 3-inchto 4-inch
pin exitedthevicinityof theantennaand was not retrieved.An evaluationof
thisinformationshowsthatthereare no knownpartsin theantenna(deployed
assembly)or deploymentassembly(mechanical)thatfit thisdescription.The
antennawas stowedand safedforpayloadbaydoor closure.
CCTVcameraD failedat approximately131:22:40G.m.t.(02:23:00MET) (Flight
ProblemSTS-49-V-12A).Attemptsto recovercamerafunctionby groundprocedure
and by the crewwere not successful.CameraD was removedduringthefirstEVA
and replacedwith themiddeckcameraduringthe secondEVA./
CCTV cameraB videowas degraded(an imagewas burnedinto the picture),but
othercameraand lens functionswerenominal. Attemptsto removethisburned-in
imageby exposureto a whitescenewere onlypartiallysuccessful.Likewise,
cameraC alsohad a burned-inimage,hut it was onlyvisibleduringlow-light
operatingconditions.
Duringcheckoutfor thesecondEVA, theEV2 helmet-mountedtelevisioncamera
failed(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-12B),The batterieswere replaced,but thisdid
not correcttheproblem,and the camerawas not used forany subsequentEVA's.
STS-49was the firstflightof TACAN'sthatweremanufacturedby Collins. These
TACAN'swere flownin positions2 and 3. Operationwas nominaluntilabout
threehourspriorto landingwhen TACAN3 data indicatedintermittentself-test
failures(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-30).SincetheTACANrangeand bearingdata
appearedto be good,thedatawouldindicatea periodicself-testfailure.
. The crew reportedthattheradar-altimeter-Iindicationswere out-of-tolerance
duringthe rolloutafterlanding(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-34).The radar
altimeterwas indicating3.68 feetand shouldhave indicated6 + 2 feet. The
radaraltimeterwillbe recalibrateduringturnaroundactivities.
Displaysand ControlsSubsystem
Duringthe secondEVA at 132:21:12G.m.t.(003:21:32MET),thecrewreported
_ that the forwardportpayloadbay floodlightwouldnot illuminateat powerup
(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-IIA).About49 minuteslater,the crewrepoweredthe
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floodlightand a 1.5-amperespikewas noted,butno additionalelectrical
signaturethatwouldindicatenominalpayloadbay floodlightoperationwas ....
observed.The lightwas againturnedoff and remainedoff for the restof the
mission. Prematurefailureshave beenfoundto be causedby thewire lengthin
the lights'ballast,and thewireswill be reroutedto eliminatethisanomaly.
At 133:17:15G.m.t.(04:17:35MET),the crewreportedthat the forwardstarboard
payloadbay floodlightflickeredand thenfailedto illuminate(FlightProblem
STS-49-V-IIB).The datashowedthatthe crewhad poweredup twoof the three
floodlightson main bus B. The dataalsoshowedthatonlyone of the two
floodlightsturnedon whilethe other(crewreportedthe forwardstarboard
light)flickeredand failedoff.
At 134:21:11G.m.t.(05:21:31MET),thecrewreportedthattheaft starboard
and forwardbulkheadpayloadbay floodlightsfailedto illuminatewhen turned
on (FlightProblemsSTS-49-V-IICand STS-49-V-IID).Analysisof the data
indicatesthat the remotepowercontroller(RPC)for the aft starboard
floodlight rippedoff. The mostlikelycauseof the failurewas a shortwithin
the floodlightelectronicsassemblythatcausedtheRPC to trip.
The crewreportedthatthedc amperessignalstrengthmeterwas sticky,and on
many occasions,the meterdisplayednumbersas high as 400 for signalstrength
duringa periodof low or no signal(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-35).The crewalso
statedthatby tappingon theglassfaceof themeter,the indicationwould
returnto zero.
OperationalInstrumentation _--.
The operationalinstrumentationsubsystemoperatednominally throughoutthe
missionwith no problems that affected the successfulcompletionof the mission.
At 133:04:16G.m.t. (04:03:36MET), the modular auxiliarydata system (MADS)
tape recorder did not respond to a snapshot run command. This conditionwas a
known possibilitydiscoveredduring preflightprocessing. Five additional
commandswere sent and the recorderbegan operatingproperly and continued to
operate properly for the remainderof the mission. The data have a criticality
of 3/3 and are processedafter the flight.
Structuresand MechanicalSubsTstems
The prelaunchhatch electricalcontinuitycheck after hatch closure revealed
that two of the continuitymeasurementswere unsatisfactory. A workaround
procedure,which involvedreopeningthe hatch and visually checking the latches,
verified that 17 of 18 latcheswere over center. The hatch was again closed and
the continuitychecks were completedwith satisfactoryresults.
At 134:02:08G.m.t. (05:02:28MET), the B system payload retentionlatch
assembly (PRLA) 4 ready-to-latch/latchindicationswere intermittent(Flight
Problem STS-49-V-17). This was noted during the ASEM setup in preparationfor
INTELSAT capture. The latch was verified to have operatedon two motors and to
be firmly latched; consequently,there was no concernfor these erroneous
indicationsduring the remainderof the mission. A loose connectoris the most
likely cause of the intermittentindications. _--,
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Both payloadbay doors were closed by 137:17:37G.m.t. (08:17:57MET);
_ however, during the port door closure, the aft bulkhead latch indicationsfailed
to indicatelatched (FlightProblemSTS-49-V-22). The latcheswere driven to
the released position in the nominal dual motor drive time of 24 seconds. The
latcheswere then driven to the latchedposition,and a currentspike was noted
20 seconds into the operation,indicatingthe existenceof some type of
obstruction. The port aft bulkheadlatch indicationswere not received.
The Orbiterdrag chute performedwell during the STS-49 landing. The door
separatedin accordancewith the design and a successfulpilot parachute
• deploymentand inflationfollowed. The drag parachutewas extractedby the
pilot parachuteand the drag parachuteinflated to the reefed condition.
Followingthe successfuloperationof the reefingline cutter, the drag
parachuteinflated to the fully inflatedcondition. Photographicanalysis
showed that the reefed drag parachuterode at a higher angle than expected,but
after the disreefoccurred,the parachuterode where it was expected. The
trajectoryof the door was also different than seen during the B-52 tests. The
door cleared all Orbiterhardwareas planned,but stayed in the air longer and
was closer to the Orbiter centerlinethan expected. Both of these conditions
have been attributedto the aerodynamicflow for the fully open speed brake.
All drag parachutehardwarewas recoveredand showed no signs of abnormal
operation. The drag parachutemortar cover was found approximately5,650 ft
from the Orbiter and 50 ft left of the runway centerline. The door was found
approximately50 ft closer to the Orbiter on the runway centerline. Four
distinct door impact marks were observed to the left of the runway centerline.
F The sabot and attached pilot parachutebag were anotherI0 ft closer to the
Orbiter and i0 ft left of the runway centerline. The pilot parachutewas an
additional30 ft closer to the Orbiterand 15 ft right of the runway centerline.
The main parachutewas locatedapproximately750 ft from the Orbiterjust to the
right of the runway centerline.
The main landinggear tires were consideredto be in good conditionfor a
concrete runway landing. The brakingdata are shown in the table on the
followingpage.
Aerodynamics,Heatin_,and Thermal Interfaces
The ascent and entry aerodynamicswere nominal,and the integratedheatingwas
within the experiencedata base. The controlsurfaces respondedas expected and
the angle of attack was nominal. DTO 249 (ForwardRCS Flight Test) was not
performedbecause the forwardRCS propellantremainingwas below the minimum
required for that maneuver.
Thermal Control Subsystem
The thermalcontrol subsystemoperatednominallywith the exceptionof two
anomaloussensors, bur all temperatureswere maintainedwithin acceptable
limits.
The FES feedwateraccumulatorlhigh-loadsecondaryline system 1 heater was noted
to be failed on (FlightProblemSTS-49-V-03). A more derailed discussionof
'_-_ this anomaly is located in the EnvironmentalControland Life SupportSubsystem
sectionof this report.
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LANDINGAND BRAKING PARAMETERS
From
Parameter threshold, Speed, Sink rate, ft/sec Pitch rate,
ft keas de_/sec
Main gear touchdown 2166 198.4 <I.0 n/a
Nose gear touchdown 5770 163.2 n/a -2.9
Drag chute deploy 160 knots (keas)
Braking initiation speed 100.9 knots
Drag chute jettison 50.6 knots
Brake-on time 26.3 seconds
Rollout distance 9490 feet
Rollout time 54.7 seconds
Orbiterweightat landing - 201,259.0ib
Brakesensorlocation Pressure, Brakeassembly Energy,
psia millionft-lb
Left-handinboard1 1092 Left-handoutboard 16.88
Left-handinboard3 1056 Left-handinboard 18.25
Left-handoutboard2 1080 Right-handinboard 13.81
Left-handoutboard4 996 Right-handoutboard 13.04
Right-handinboard1 852
Right-handinboard3 840
Right-handoutboard2 792
Right-handoutboard4 756
The forward RCS thrusterF4R heater failed on during prelaunchoperations
(Flight Problem STS-49-V-OI). This anomaly is discussedin more detail in the
Reaction Control Subsystemsection of this report.
The improvedAPU (IAPU) 3 fuel test line sensor 2 violated the lower LCC limit
of 48 °F during prelaunchoperations. Likewise,the IAPU 1 fuel test line
system B heater cycled close to the 48 °F lower limit during cryogenicsloading
and during on-orbit operations. The heater wrap configurationfor these two
IAPU's will be checkedduring the turnaroundprocessingat KSC. The heater will
also be checked at KSC.
The OMS oxidizer crossfeedlow point drain line heaterscycled below the 50 °F
f._t detection and annunciation(FDA) limit while configuredon system A.
AerothermodTnamics
The aerothermodynamicsdata for the STS-49 missionwere within the previous
experience base with no significantanomalies.
2O
Thermal ProtectionSubsystem
The TPS performancewas nominal compared to previous flights. This is based on
structuraltemperatureresponsedata and some tile surface temperature
measurements. The overall boundarylayer transitionfrom laminar flow to
turbulentflow was symmetric,occurringat 1275 secondsafter entry interface.
The OrbiterTPS sustaineda total of 114 hits of which ii had a major dimension
of 1 inch or greater. This total does not include the numeroushits on the base
heat shield that are attributedto engine vibro-acousticsand exhaustplume
" recirculation. A comparisonof these numberswith statisticsfrom 31 previous
flightsof similar configurationindicatesthat the total number of hits is
slightlyless than averageand the number of hits 1 inch or greater is much less
than average. No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, tires,
or brakes. The payloadbay doors, upper wing surfaces,and OMS pod TPS
performancewas nominal.
The Orbiter lower surfacesustaineda total of 55 hits of which 6 had a major
dimensionof 1 inch or greater. The distributionof hits on the lower surface
does not point to a single source of ascent debris,but indicatesa sheddingof
ice and TPS debris from random sources.
The most significanthit observedmeasured 9 5/8 by 2 5/8 by 1/4 inch and was
locatedon the right side of the vehicle immediatelyaft of the nose cap
reinforcedcarbon carbon (RCC). The size and depth of this damage site is
indicativeof an impact by a low-densitymaterial such as ET TPS foam. Overall,
f all external inspectionsof RCC parts revealednominal flight performance.
Postflight internalinspectionsof the RCC chin panel revealed that the clevis
bolt for the no. 6 lug had contactedthe RCC, causingminor internalsurface
damage.
Damage to the base heat shield tiles was much less than normal. No indications
of tile damage were noted in the center of the base heat shield that may have
resulted from the oscillationsobserved in the launch photography. Several
tiles on the centerlineof the body flap stub upper surfaceand adjacent tiles
on the body flap upper surfacewere damaged.
The redesignedmechanicallyattachedET door thermalbarriersperformedwell and
showed no sign of degradation. The room temperaturevulcanizing(RTV) shims
that had been installedto increase the pressure seal also showed no signs of
deterioration. No evidenceof flow paths was found, indicatingthat the door
had sealed properly. The redesignedmain landinggear door thermalbarriers
exhibitedone minor breached2-inch sectionof the right-handaft outboard
thermalbarrier. The nose landinggear door thermalbarrieralso had one minor
. 3-inch breached segment. The main engine closeoutblanketswere in excellent
conditionand showed no signs of fraying.
- All Orbiterwindows exhibitedtypicalhazing. A few small streakswere noted on
windows 3 and 4. Sampleswere taken from the variouswindows for laboratory
analysis. The crew reported that an impacthad occurredwindow 1 on flight
day 8, and the crew photographedthe impactpoint (FlightProblemSTS-49-V-36).
During the turnaroundactivity,the window was removedand the impact point was
/'-_ evaluated. A new window was installed.
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The TPS blanketscoveringboth the right-handand left-hand9 ventdoorsshowed
a yellowishdiscoloration.Thisdiscolorationappearedsimilarto,althoughnot
as pronouncedas, thatobservedon the0V-103right-handvent door 7 afterthe
STS-42mission.
A numberof damagesiteswere notedon the perimetertilesof thewindows. Most
of the impactsightswere onlysurfacecoatinglossesor wereno more than
1/16inch in depth. This damagemay havebeen causedby theRTV materialused
to bondpapercoversto the forwardRCS nozzlesor by exhaustproductsfrom the
SRB boosterseparationmotors.
An infraredradiometerwas used to measurethesurfacetemperatureof several
areasof theOrbiterTPS afterlanding. The readingswere taken97 minutes
afterwheelsstop at whichtimethe nose-capRCC was 162 °F and the right-hand
wing leadingedgeRCC panel17 was 140 °F. Thesetemperaturesare about60 "F
abovenormal. Analysishas shownthat the temperatureincreaseis due to the
presenceof the coatingthatwas addedthisflightto protecttheRCC from the
externalenvironment.
In theareawherethe dragparachuteis located,twodamagedtileswere noted.
One was locatedon the lower(-Z)edgeof the dragparachuteopeningand the
otherwas on theleft-handloweredgeof the verticalstabilizer"stinger".It
is hypothesizedthatthe damageoccurredduringthedrag parachutedeployment
operations.
REMOTEMANIPULATORSYSTEM _-_
The RMS hardwareperformancewas nominal. The RMS objectivesfor STS-49
involvedEVA supportduringthecaptureand retrievalof the INTELSATsatellite,
plussupportduringASEM operations.SupportduringtheINTELSATEVA,whichwas
plannedas a one-dayactivity,was to utilizethe RMS to grapplethe capturebar
afterattachmentto theINTELSATand maneuverthe satelliteinto the payloadbay
wherea perigeekick motorcouldbe attachedby the crewmembers. The INTELSAT
objectiverequiredthreeEVA'sto accomplish,and as a result,the ASEM
activitiesduringthe fourthEVA wereseverelycurtailed.The RMS provided
excellentsupportduringthe threeINTELSATEVA'sand duringtheASEM EVA,as
well as duringthe observationsof a simultaneouswasteand supplywaterdump.
An RMS checkoutwas performedon flightday I, followedby a payloadbay photo
survey. Duringthe photosurvey,fivevernierconsistencycheck(VCC)alarms
were annunciatedon thewristjointsforall threeaxes (FlightProblem
STS-49-V-06).The VCC comparesthecommandedratewith theactualposition.
The differencebetweenthe twomeasuredparametersis boundedin software. If
the differenceis exceededfor fourGPC cycles,theRMS brakesare applied
automatically,theRMS masteralarmis sounded,and the failureis annunciated
by the SM faultmessage. Each timethebrakeswere applied,theoperatorwas
requiredto cyclethe brakesbeforethearm couldbe used again.
Analysisindicatesthatthe alarmswere causedby overlyconservativeVCC limits
and that theRMS was functioningproperly.An approvedGMEMwas uplinkedthat
widenedtheVCC limitsfor one payloadidentifier(PLID)to thecoarselimit
valuesand no otherproblemsoccurred.
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A payload deployment and retrieval system (PDRS) arm-based electronics (ABE)
_ built-in test equipment (BITE) was annunciated when the RMS was powered up. The
ABE failure warning was specifically a shoulder pitch tachometer fail flag.
This bit indicates the health of the tachometer processing within the servo
power amplifier (SPA) of each joint. This is one of four BITE bits sent from
each SPA on the serial return data bus and 3N filtered in the MCIU before being
sent to the GPC. The 3N filtering is to remove transients that occur on the
data bus or in the SPA. The most likely cause of this annunciation was an EMI
transient lasting longer than the 3N filter in the MCIU. No other annunciation
of this kind occurred, and shoulder pitch rates were nominal throughout the
remainder of the mission. A similar transient occurred with the wrist yaw
commutator BITE flag on STS-3.
Operation of the RMS during the flight day 4 EVA was satisfactory, and no VCC
false alarms were annunciated. Based on this experience, and to provide support
for the rest of the flight activities, a second GMEM was uplinked that changed
the VCC error thresholds on the remaining five PLID's.
On flight day 7, the RMS was used in support of the three-crew-member EVA to
successfully capture and berth the INTELSAT satellite.
The RMS was used again on flight day 8 to support the fourth EVA, which was
performed to evaluate the ASEM flight experiment. The RMS was used to maneuver
a multipurpose experiment support structure (MPESS) into contact with the EVA
assembled truss structure using EVA crew member voice commands and cues to the
RMS operator rather than operator line-of-sight cues. This EVA was originally
/_ plannedas RMS intensive;however,the RMS was used to accomplishonlyone ASEM
operation. The timeline for the ASEM activities was also impacted when one EVA
crew person was required to stow the failed Ku-band antenna.
EXTRAVEHICULARACTIVITIES
The extravehicular mobility units (EMU's) were checked out for the first planned
EVA. During EMU checkout, the service and cooling umbilical (SCU) current
recorded during fan operation on EMU 3 and 4 was lower than the values on the
EVA checklist. Actual values recorded were 2.0 and 2.1 amps, respectively;
checklist values are 2.4 to 3.6 amps. EMU I also experienced current readings
below checklist values. The observed values were not considered to be a problem
because this display and control module (DCM) has a lower current draw than the
previous configuration DCM. Checklist criteria are presently under review.
The first EVA was performed on flight day 4. Airlock depressurization was
- initiated at 131:20:17 G.m.t. (02:20:37 MET), and the airlock outer hatch was
opened 8 minutes later. The EVA was begun with the capture bar being unstowed
and checked out, followed by installation of the portable foot restraint
attachment device (PAD). The EV1 crew member then ingressed the PAD and the RMS
operator moved EVI to the capture position. Numerous attempts were made to dock
and engage the capture bar, but the satellite was pushed away and appeared to be
nutating. After the unsuccessful docking attempts, the capture bar was restowed
23
and thepayloadbay cleanupwas completed.Airlockrepressurizationwas
initiatedat 132:00:15G.m.t.(03:00:35MET)with a totalEVA durationof --'-
3 hours43 minutes.
EV2 experiencedan alerttoneand "SETPWR SCU"messageat 131:20:37G.m.t
(02:20:57MET),and receivedthe samemessageapproximately19 minuteslater
duringa statuscheck(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-07).Duringthe post-EVA
debriefing,EV2 reportedthatthe "SETPWR SCU"messagewas acknowledgedI0 to
15 timesduringthe EVA. The "SETPWR SCU"messagerequires-13 voltsto be
sensedby theC/W softwarefor 1 minute. The primaryreasonfor the issuanceof
themessagewas eitheran opticalcouplerUVI03outputshortor a powermode
switchshorton any of fourswitch-contactcombinations.Underany of these
conditions,the C/W will sensethatthe SCUwas apparentlyconnectedand the
powermode switchwas in the BATTpositionfor more than60 seconds. The "SET
PWR SCU"messagewill thenoccur. Anotherremotepossibilityfor the
intermittentshortwas electromagneticinterference(EMI). A powermode switch
shortwas consideredto be themostprobablecauseof thiscondition.Aftera
reviewof EVA data,it was observedthattheEMU batterywas not exposedto the
worst-casepotentialovercurrentcondition(causedby one of the identified
switchshortconditions).Uponsuccessfulchargingon the middeckbattery
charger,it was recommendedthattheEMU 2 continueto be used. This anomaly
did not recurduringsubsequentuse.
The secondEVA, performedon flightday 5, was initiatedwith airlock
depressurizationat approximately132:20:30G.m.t.(03:20:50MET). The capture
bar was againunstowedand theEVl crewpersonpracticedsatellitecaptureby
bumpingthe capturebar againsta payloadbay handrail.Numerouscapture _._.
attemptswere againmade,all of whichwere unsuccessful.The satellitewas
successfullyslowed,but capturebar dockingcouldnot be completed.After
capturebar stowageand payloadbay cleanup,the two crewpersonsenteredthe
airlockand repressurizationwas initiatedat 133:02:31G.m.t.(04:02:51MET)
for a totalextravehiculartimeof 5 hours30 minutes. Communications
operationsthroughouttheEVA were excellent.
DuringthisEVA, it was notedthatEV2 lostelectrocardiogram(EKG)data. When
doffingthe suit,the crew reportedthattheorangewire in the EKG harnesshad
come loose. Also duringsuit doffing,EVI receiveda "FANSWITCHOFF"message.
The most probablecausefor thismessagewas a stickysuit pressuretransducer.
This is a low prioritymessageand was not a constraint o furtheruse of the
EVI suit.
The thirdEVA, performedon flightday 7, includedthreeEVA crewmembers. Each
crewmemberconfiguredthe extravehicularcommunicatorin the EMU to the backup
mode,and selectedvoice-activatedmicrophonekeying(commonlyknownas V0X).
CommunicationschecksduringEVl and EV2 EMU purgerevealedsome feedbackin
VOX, but any difficultycouldbe clearedby switchingto push-to-talk(PTT)
mode. Prebreatheactivitieswere begunand theexternalhatchwas openedat
134:21:10G.m.t.(05:21:30MET).
The satellitecapturescenariobeganwith buildingthe bottomplaneof theASEM
truss. A portablefoot restraint(PFR)was attachedto the trussalongthe
centerlineof the payloadbay. A secondfootrestraintwas attachedalongthe
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side of the payload bay, and a PAD was attached to the RMS. The intent was to
f-_ placethe threeextravehicularcrewmembersin a triangleshapeso thateach
couldgraba differentgearbox/motoron the satelliteat the same time.
Althoughsatellitenutationwas higherthanexpected,thesatellitewas
successfullycapturedat 134:23:55G.m.t.(06:00:15MET). The capturebar was
thenattachedand the nominalsatelliteberthingprocedureswere initiated.
DuringtheINTELSATactivities,EV2 crew personreportedthathis suitDCM was
unreadable(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-28).The EV2 crewpersonalso reportedthe
sameproblemwhilein theairlock.
The perigeekickmotorwas attachedto thesatellite,and all threecrewmembers
were in the airlockwhilethe satellitewas deployedat 135:04:53G.m.t.
(06:05:13MET). Afterpayloadbay cleanup,airlockrepressurizationwas
initiatedat 135:05:42G.m.t.(06:06:02MET). The timeof the thirdEVA was
8 hours29 minutes,whichis the longestEVA on record.
The fourthand finalEVA of the STS-49missionwas performedon flightday 8.
The EV3 and EV-4 crewpersonsbeganairlockdepressurizationat
135:20:42G.m.t.(06:21:14MET). The EV3 crewmemberhad a constant"PWR
RESTART"messagewhen the statuscheckwas attempted(FlightProblem
STS-49-V-27).The alerttoneand BITElightbothcleared,but theEV3 crew
personwas instructedto returnto the SCU powerwhilean assessmentof the
conditionwas made. The EMU powerdrawwas acceptableand thereal timedata
systemshowedacceptabledata and nominalperformance.Basedon the capability
to monitorEMU performanceon theground,thedecisionwas made to continuethe
EVA. SuitperformanceremainednominalthroughoutheEVA. Airlockegress
_o occurredat 135:21:30G.m.t.(06:21:50MET). The EVA includednominalASEM
activities,a crewpropulsiondevice(CPD)evaluation,and Ku-bandantenna
restow. Over-the-noseEVA operationswere not performedbecauseof time
limitations.The ASEM trussbase planeremainedinstalledfor landing. Airlock
repressurizationwas initiatedat 136:04:52G.m.t.(07:05:12MET). The duration
of the fourthEVA was 7 hours45 minutes.
Duringthe thirdand fourthEVA's,a numberof minorproblemsoccurredthathave
beenjoinedtogetheras one in-flightanomaly. Theseproblemsare as follows:
a. Retractabletetherreel- theretractabletetherreel failedto retract
(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-32a);
b. Powertooltether- The retractabletetheron the powertoolbroke
(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-32b);
c. Portablefootrestraint(PFR)- One of theadjustablejointson thePFR
lostits capabilityfor adjustment(FlightProblemSTS-49-V-32c).Thislosswas
. probably caused by a jammed adjustment knob;
d. Safety tether reel lock - The safety tether lock would not lock (Flight
Problem STS-49-V-32d). The lock lever could not be moved to the lock position;
e. A loudnoisewas heardover theEMU headsetwhen theEVA powertoolwas
operated during the third EVA (Flight Problem STS-49-V-32e); and
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f. Mini-workstationmechanism - The lock knob of the end effector tether
stiffenedup to a high actuation torque. Also, the lock knob of the end ...._I
effector jaws spun too freely to positionsopposite from the desired setting
(FlightProblem STS-49-V-32f).
While EMU battery recharge operationswere being performedwith the middeck
battery charger, it was noted that both the red and green lights on one side of
the battery charger (S/N 1002) were out (FlightProblem STS-49-V-29). An
attempt to use the spare batterychargeryielded the same results. This
indicatesa potentialproblemwith the battery (S/N 1181) that was being
charged. The chargers and the batteryhave undergoneground testing,and the
problem has not repeated during this testing.
When remountingEMU 2 to the airlockwall after completionof the EVA's, the
crew were unable to insert a pin in the lower forwardmount (FlightProblem
STS-49-V-31). The crew had to loosen four bolts on the airlockadapter plate
(AAP) joint, refit the AAP, and retightenthe bolts to secure EMU 2.
GOVERNMENTFURNISHEDEOUIPMENTAND FLIGHTCREWEOUIPMENT
The government furnished equipment and flight crew equipment performance was
satisfactory with the exceptions noted in the following paragraphs.
The 35mm Nikon camera system databack batteries failed; however, spare batteries
were available and nominal camera operation was regained. The 40mm lens
focusing prism split image would not line up when used with the 70mm Hasselblad
camera SYstem, and use of the lens was lost for the remainder of the mission•
The electronic still camera system battery pack failed; however, spare batteries
were used and the camera function was regained.
The crew reported that the galley auxiliary hot water port dispensed cooler
water than expected. The water temperature at this port is design-limited
because of constraints placed by NASA Safety. However, the water temperature at
that point may be improved by modifying (changing diameter, insulating, or
shortening) the personal hygiene hose or flowing water into the WCS until the
warmer water reaches the end of the hose.
CARGOINTEGRATION
All integration hardware performed nominally.
PAYLOADS/EXPERIMENTS
The five payloads/experiments flown on STS-49 are described in the following
paragraphs•
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INTELSAT SATELLITE
Rendezvous with the satellite was completed as planned on flight day 4; however,
the capture bar could not be installed. A second rendezvous was completed on
flight day 5, and similar capture bar results were attained. On flight day 7,
three EVA crew members manually captured the INTELSAT, installed the capture
bar, and mated the satellite to the perigee kick motor. Later the same day,
" (May 13, 1992, at 11:53 p.m.c.d.t.) the INTELSAT was deployed. The INTELSAT
perigee kick motor fired nominally on May 14, at 12:25 p.m.c.d.t. At the time
of this writing, INTELSAT is in geosynchronous orbit, all appendages have been
• deployed and the communications payload checkout is in progress. The satellite
is currently planned to be in service in mid-July of 1992 for use in relaying
the Barcelona Olympic Games to the United States.
ASSEMBLY OF STATION BY EVA METHODS
Due to the three EVA's required for INTELSAT activities, the ASEM operations
were replanned to be performed in one EVA period. The ASEM base plane was
installed on flight day 7 to support INTELSAT retrieval. During flight day 8,
two EVA crew members performed the following ASEM activities:
a. The ASEM attachment fixture build was completed.
b. The crew propulsive device was evaluated.
c. Six of eight legs were installed on the MPESS
f-
d. Three point pallet attachment was attempted, using both minimum and
full-compliance berthing, but it was unsuccessful.
e. Some diminished lighting evaluation was accomplished in the payload bay
because of the failure of two forward payload bay floodlights and the forward
bulkhead floodlight. The non-extravehlcular crew person provided assistance
using a hand-held spotlight that was pointed out the aft flight deck windows.
f. The attachment fixture was partially disassembled and stowed; however,
the bottom plane was left intact for landing.
An unexpected addition to this EVA was the stowage of the Ku-band antenna which
had a positioning motor failure that prevented the antenna from being stowed
automatically. No over-the-nose activities were performed. The extended
duration of the ASEM EVA activities prevented complete stowage of the base
plane. The base plane remained installed for landing and ferry flight.
COMMERCIAL PROTEIN CRYSTAL GROWTH
The Commercial Protein Crystal Growth (CPCG) performed well for most of the
mission with temperature excursion alarms being the only exception. When a
temperature alarm occurred, the crew cleaned the filter, reset the alarm, and
operations then continued nominally until the next temperature excursion alarm.
The crew cleaned the filter daily. The temperature anomaly that occurred on
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flight day 1 was early enough in the temperature profile that no damage to the
crystal was expected. Assuming the temperature fluctuation on flight day 9 was
real, a small degradation of the crystals is probable.
AIR FORCE MAUl OPTICAL SITE CALIBRATION
No nightor twilightpasseswere availableforThe Air ForceMaui OpticalSite
Calibration(AMOS)operationsduringthemission.
ULTRAVIOLETFLUMEINSTRUMENT
The ultravioletplumeinstrument(UVPI)objectiveswerenot accomplishedsince
therewas no Orbiterobservationopportunitiesduringthemission.
DEVELOPMENTEST OBJECTIVESAND DETAILEDSUPPLEMENTARYOBJECTIVES
A totalof 18 DTO'sand 13 DSO'swere assignedto the STS-49flight. From this
total,14 DTO'sand 13 DSO'swereaccomplished.The followingparagraphs
providemore detailson eachDTO andDSO.
DEVELOPMENTESTOBJECTIVES
AscentDTO's
DTO 301D- AscentStructuralCapabilityEvaluation- This DTO is a data-onlyDTO _---
and the datawere collected.The sponsoris evaluatingthedata andwill
publisha formalreportin the future.
DTO 305D- AscentCompartmentVentingEvaluation- This DTO is a data-onlyDT0
and thedatawere collected.The sponsoris evaluatingthedata and will
publisha formalreportin the future.
On-OrbitDTO's
DTO 312- ET TPS Performance(Methods1 and2 - WithNo Maneuvers)- The
attitudesafter separationwere not appropriateto observe the ET from the crew
cabin; consequently,no hand-heldphotographyof the ET was obtained. The
umbilicalwell camera operatedproperly;however, the darknessat the time of
film exposure made the photographyunusable.
DTO 325 - Waste and Supply Water Dumps (SimultaneousDump I) - The first dump of
the waste and supply water was performedsimultaneously,and the dump was
documentedusing the RMS wrist camera. The video data have been given to the
sponsor for evaluation.
DTO 623 - Cabin Air Monitoring- Cabin air data were gathered for this DTO, and
the data have been given to the sponsorfor evaluation.
DTO 640 - HydrazineMonitoring- The data were collectedfor this DTO, and the
data have been given to the sponsorfor evaluation. ,_
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Entr_/Landin_ DTO's
DTO 249 - ForwardRCS FlightTest (12-SecondPulse)- ThisDTO was not performed
becausethe propellantremainingwas not sufficient o supportthis testas well
as entry.
DTO 306D- DescentCompartmentVentingEvaluation- ThisDTO is a data-onlyDTO
and the datawere collected.The sponsoris evaluatingthedata and a formal
reportwillbe publishedin the future.
• DTO 307D- EntryStructuralCapability- ThisDTO is a data-onlyDTO and the
datawere collected.The sponsoris evaluatingthedataand a formalreport
will be publishedin thefuture.
DTO 519 - CarbonBrakeSystemTest (Condition6) - The DTO was performedand all
aspectsof the carbonbrakesweresatisfactory.Datahave beengivento the
sponsorforevaluation.
DTO 520 - EdwardsLakeBed RunwayBearingStrength- ThisDTO was not
accomplishedbecausethelandingtookplaceon the concreterunwayat Edwards.
DTO 521 - OrbiterDrag ChuteSystem(SystemI) - The drag chutewas deployedin
accordancewith thepreflightplans. All operationalareasof the dragchute
performedproperly. Photographicand videodataof thedrag chuteoperation
have beengivento thesponsorforevaluation.
DTO 648 - ElectronicsStillCameraPhotographyTest (WithDownlink)- This/7......
camerawas usedvery successfullyand data and photographsare in thepossession
of the sponsor.
DTO 651 - CycleErgometerHardwareEvaluation- The datawere collectedfor this
DTO and havebeengivento thesponsorfor evaluation.
DTO 663 - AcousticalNoiseDosimeterData - The acousticalnoisedatawere
collectedthroughout hemission,and the datahavebeengivento thesponsor
for evaluation.
DTO 700-2 - Laser Range and Range Rate Data - The laser range finder performed
very well and the data are being evaluated by the sponsor. Initial conclusions
indicate that the instrument performed excellently for rendezvous and proximity
operations.
DTO 728 - Ku-band Antenna Friction - This DTO was not accomplished because of
the failure of the Ku-band antenna.
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - This DTO was not accomplished as the
crosswind conditions at landing did not meet the minimum criteria of this DTO.
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DSO 469 - In-flightRadiationDoseDistribution- Datawere successfully
collected,and the datahavebeengivento the sponsorfor evaluation.
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DSO 482 - Cardiac Rhythm DisturbancesDuring EVA - Data were successfully .....
collected,and the data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation.
DSO 603 - OrthostaticFunctionDuring Entry, Landing, and Egress - EDO - Data
were successfullycollected,and the data have been given to the sponsor for
evaluation.
DSO 604 - Visual-VestibularIntegrationas a Functionof Adaptation- ED0 - Data
were successfullycollected,and the datahavebeen givento the sponsorfor
evaluation.
DSO 605 - PosturalEquilibriumControlDuringLanding/Egress- EDO - Data were
successfullycollected,and the datahavebeengivento the sponsorfor
evaluation.
DSO 613 - EndocrineRegulation- EDO - Datawere successfullycollected,and the
datahave beengivento the sponsorforevaluation.
DS0 614 - Beadand Gaze StabilityDuringLocomotion- ED0 - Datawere
successfullycollected,and the datahavebeen givento the sponsorfor
evaluation.
DSO 617 - Evaluationof FunctionalSkeletalMusclePerformance- EDO - Datawere
successfullycollected,and the datahave beengivento the sponsorfor
evaluation.
DSO 621 - In-FlightUse of Florinef- EDO - Datawere successfullycollected, "---.
and the datahave beengivento thesponsorfor evaluation.
DSO 802 - EducationalActivities- Datawere successfullycollected,and the
data have beengivento the--sponsorfor evaluation.
DSO 901 - DocumentaryTelevision- ThisDSO was performedand the datahave been
givento thesponsorfor evaluation.
DSO 902 - DocumentaryMotionPicturePhotography- ThisDSO was performedand
the photographydatahave beengivento thesponsorfor evaluation.
DSO 903 - DocumentaryStillPhotography- ThisDS0 was performedand the
photographydata have beengivento the sponsorforevaluation.
PHOTOGRAPHICAND TELEVISIONANALYSIS
LAUNCH DATA ANALYSIS
On launch day, all 23 of the expectedvideos were screened. On the following
days, 60 of the 61 expected films were also reviewed. One item of interestwas
an unusual flexing of the Orbiterbase heat shield observed at SSME ignition.
Photographicanalysts and Orbiter engineeringpersonnelevaluated this condition
and noted also that this same flexinghad been seen in previous mission launch .__
photography.
3O
ON-ORBITPHOTOGRAPHYANALYSIS
Analysis of electronicstill camera images that had been downlinkedby the crew
was performed. These photographswere of the INTELSAT satellite,and the
analysisrevealedno sharp edges that could cause suit damage during the three-
crew-memberEVA when the INTELSAT was manually captured.
LANDINGDATA ANALYSIS
Nine landingvideos includingan infraredview and NASA Select were received
• about 2.5 hours after landing for review. The videos providedgood coverageof
the drag chute deploy and jettison. No anomalousconditionsor events were
noted in the landingvideo analysis.
!
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TABLEI.- STS-49SEQUENCEOF EVENTS
Event Description Actualtime,
G.m.t.
APU activation APU-IGG chamberpressure 128:23:35:10.27
APU-2GG chamberpressure 128:23:35:11.60
APU-3GG chamberpressure 128:23:35:12.75
SRB HPU activation LH HPU systemA startcommand 128:23:39:32.16
LH HPU systemB startcommand 128:23:39:32.32
RH HPU systemA startcommand 128:23:39:32.48
RIiHPU systemB startcommand 128:23:39:32.64
Mainpropulsion Engine3 startcommandaccepted 128:23:39:53.472
Systemstart Engine2 startcommandaccepted 128:23:39:53.561
Engine1 startcommandaccepted 128:23:39:53.693
SRB ignitioncommand SRB ignitioncommandto SRB 128:23:40:00.019
(lift-off)
throttleup to Engine3 commandaccepted 128:23:40:04.152
104 percentthrust Engine2 commandaccepted 128:23:40:04.121
Engine1 commandaccepted 128:23:40:04.133
rhrottledown to Engine3 commandaccepted 128:23:40:18.873
89 percentthrust Engine2 commandaccepted 128:23:40:18.841
Engine1 commandaccepted 128:23:40:18.853
throttledown to Engine3 commandaccepted 128:23:40:29.753
73 percentthrust Engine2 commandaccepted 128:23:40:29.721
Engine1 commandaccepted 128:23:40:29.734 _-_.
throttleup to Engine3 commandaccepted 128:23:40:55.193
104 percentthrust Engine2 commandaccepted 128:23:40:55.161
Engine1 commandaccepted 128:23:40:55.174
daximumdynamic Derivedascentdynamic 128:23:41:03
pressure(q) pressure
3othSRM'schamber LH SRM chamberpressure 128:23:42:O1.58
pressureat 50 psi mid-rangeselect
RH SRM chamberpressure 128:23:42:01.78
mid-rangeselect
_ndSRM action RH SRM chamberpressure 128:23:42:04.11
mid-rangeselect
LH SRM chamberpressure 128:23:42:04.61
mid-rangeselect
;RBseparationcommand SRB separationcommandflag 128:23:42:07
_RBphysical LH rateAPU A turbinespeedLOS 128:23:42:07.14
separation RH rateAPU A turbinespeedLOS 128:23:42:07.14
_hrottledown for Engine3 commandaccepted 128:23:47:32.003
3g acceleration Engine2 commandaccepted 128:23:47:32.005 _
Engine1 commandaccepted 128:23:47:31.981
_gacceleration Totalloadfactor 128:23:47:32.95
_ECO MECO shutdowncommandaccept 128:23:48:29
MECO confirmflag 128:23:48:29
_SMEshutdown Engine3 commandaccepted 128:23:48:29.444
Engine2 commandaccepted 128:23:48:29.446
Engine1 commandaccepted 128:23:48:29.422
_Tseparation ET separationcommandflag 128:23:48:48
32
_'-'_ TABLEI.- STS-49SEOUENCEOF EVENTS(Continued)
Event Description Actualtime,
.... G.m.t.
OMS-Iignition Leftenginebi-propvalve Not performed-
position directinsertion
Rightenginebi-propvalve trajectoryflown
position i" OMS-Icutoff Leftenginebi-propvalvepositionRightenginebi-propvalveposition
APU deactivation APU-IGG chamberpressure 128:23:54:55.30
APU-2GG chamberpressure 128:23:54:56.88
APU-3GG chamberpressure 128:23:54:58.56
0MS-2ignition Leftenginebi-propvalve 129:00:19:57.8
position
Rightenginebi-propvalve 129:00:19:57.8
position
OMS-2cutoff Left enginebi-propvalve 129:00:22:02.6
position
Rightenginehi-propvalve 129:00:22:02.6
position
Payloadbay dooropen PLBDrightopenI 129:01:15:54
........ PLBDleftopen1 129:01:20:00
OMS-3 ignition Left englne bi-prop valve 129:04:52:44.2
position
Right englne bi-prop valve N/A
- position
OMS-3cutoff Left englnebi-propvalve 129:04:53:00.6
position
Rightenglnebi-propvalve N/A
position
OMS-4ignition Leftenglnebi-propvalve N/A
position
Rightenglnebi-propvalve 129:20:45:12.8
position
OMS-4 cutoff Left engine bi-prop valve N/A
posit_on
Right englne bi-prop valve 129:20:45:30.6
position
OMS-5 ignition Left englne bi-prop valve 130:20:11:01.0
position
Right englne bi-prop valve 130: 20: ii :Ol. 0
position
0MS-5 cutoff Left englne bi-prop valve 130:20:11:47.2
positlon
Rightenginebl-propvalve 130:20:11:47.2
position
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TABLEI.- STS-49SEQUENCEOF EVENTS(Continued)
Event Description Actualtime,
G.m.t.
OMS-6ignition Leftenglnebi-propvalve N/A
position
Rightenglnebi-propvalve 130:21:17:39.6
position
OMS-6cutoff Leftenglnehi-propvalve N/A
position
Right englne bi-prop valve 130:21:17 :52.1
position
0MS-7 ignition Left englne bi-prop valve 131:15:42:50.0
position
Right englne bi-prop valve N/A
position
OMS-7cutoff Leftenglnebi-propvalve 131:15:43:08.6
position
Rightenglnebi-propvalve N/A
position
OMS-8ignition Left englnebi-propvalve 132:16:58:07.0
position
Right englne bi-prop valve N/A
position
OMS-8cutoff Left englnebi-propvalve 132:16:5816.0 _-_
position
Rightenglnebi-propvalve N/A
position
Intelsatcapture Voicecall 134:23:59
Intelsatdeployment Voicecall 135:04:53
OMS-9ignition Left enginebi-propvalve N/A
position
Rightenginebi-propvalve 135:05:39:21.9
position
OMS-9cutoff Left enginebi-propvalve N/A
position
Rightenginebi-propvalve 135:05:39:41.9
position
Intelsatperigeekick Voicecall 135:17:25
motorfiring
Flightcontrol
systemcheckout
APU start APU-2GG chamberpressure 136:18:37:59.06 .
APU stop APU-2GG chamberpressure 136:18:44:18.67
Payloadbay door close PLBD leftclose1 137:17:17:23
PLBD rightclose1 137:17:37:55
APU activation APU-IGG chamberpressure 137:19:50:20.36
for entry APU-2GG chamberpressure 137:20:14:15.45
APU-3GG chamberpressure 137:20:14:16.38
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TABLEI.- STS-49SEQUENCEOF EVENTS(Concluded)
Event Description Actualtime,
G.m.t.
Deorbitmaneuver Left enginebi-propvalve 137:19:55:15.1
ignition position
Rightenginebi-propvalve 137:19:55:14.9
position
Deorbitmaneuver Leftenginebi-propvalve 137:19:58:02.5
cutoff position
Rightenginebi-propvalve 137:19:58:02.4
position
Entryinterface Currentorbitalaltitude 137:20:27:03
(400K) abovereference llipsoid
Blackoutends Datalockedat highsample No blackout
rate
Terminalarea Majormodechange(305) 137:20:51.31
energymanagement
Main landinggear LH MLG tirepressure 137:20:57:38
contact RH MLG tirepressure 137:20:57:38
Mainlandinggear LH MLG weighton wheels 137:20:57:38
weighton wheels RIIMLG weighton wheels 137:20:57:38
Nose landinggear NLG tirepressure 137:20:57:48
contact
Nose landinggear NLG Irron Wheels-I 137:20:57:48
I_" weighton wheels
Drag chutedeployment Dragchutedeploy-i cap volts 137:20:57:49
Drag chutejettison Dragchutejettison-I capvolts 137:20:58:17.4
Wheelsstop Velocitywithrespectto 137:20:58:34
runway
APU deactivation APU-IGG chamberpressure 137:21:11:45.36
APU-2GG chamberpressure 137:21:11:46.17
APU-3GG chamberpressure 137:21:11:46.77
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TABLE II.- STS-49 PROBLEM TRACKING LIST
NUmber Title Reference Comments
STS-49-V-01RCSThrusterF4RHeater 128:03:50G.m.t. TheRCS F4Rthrusterinjectortemperaturefor fuel(V42TI514C)and
Failed On IM49RF01 oxidizer (V42TISI3C) continually increased since the thruster heater
FRCS-01-002I was turnedon at 128:03:50G.n.t.The forwardRCSnodulehas been
removed and sent to HMF for thruster repari.
KSC: Vendor will repair thruster (bench work) at the HMF.
STS-49-V-02 Oxygen Manifold 1 129:05:50 G.n.t. The PRSD oxygen manifold I isolation valve failed to close when
IM49RF02 commanded. An additional attenpt to close on-orbit was unsuccessful.
IPR-47V-0014 KSC: Troubleshooting complete. No anomaly found. Potential UA.
I
STS-49-V-03 FES Accumulator Hi-Load 129:08:30 G.n.t. !The FES accusulator/high load line B heater 1 appears to be failed on.
Line B Heater 1 Failed IM49RF03 Heater B was selected. Indicative of a loose thermostat on the
IPR 47V-0012 accumulator line.
I KSC: Vendor at KSC reworking the heater thermostat.
STS-49-V-04PCSOxygenSysten2 129:19:31O.n._. INooxygenflowwas registeredon sensorVSIR2205Athroughouthe
Flowmeter Failed IM49RF04 mission. Secondary indications satisfactory. Sensor failed.
IPR 47V-0013 KSC: Panel MOIOWhas been removed and sent to MBMR. Troubleshooting
complete. Defer flow mater replacemant until panel is returned.
STS-49-V-05 Master Events Controller 2 Prelaunch During the T-20 minute preflight BITE READ of master events controller
BITEFailure IPR47V-0005 (MEC)2, wordI0 bit9 wassetto I whenit shouldhavebeen0. Two
XM49RF21 subsequent reads showed the bit to be 0. Flew as is doe to no hard
failure and adequate MZC redundancy.
t_ KSC: Plan for troubleshooting has been developed. No chit required.O_
Replaced by vendor per OEI,-0683.
STS-49-V-06 RMS False Alarms 129:22:00 G.n.t. (:ontrol errors were experienced during RMS checkout and again during
Intelsat capture attest,
KSC: No action required.
STS-49-V-07Extravehicularc ewperson131:21:15G.n.t. Extravehicularc ewperson(EV)-2 receivedan alerttoneandthe "SET
-2 "SETPWRSCU"Message PWR St'U"massageon D_M. Thisnessagewas received10to 15 tlmos
(GFE) dorlng the EVA. Unit returned to JSC
KSC: No action required.
STS-49-V-08 Avionics Bay 3 AP 128:23:57 G.n.t. Avionicsbey 3 differentialpressuresindicatinghigherthanexpected
IPR 47V-0011 values at 14.7and 10.2psia cabin pressure.
KSC: Removed, cleaned, and reinstalled TACAN 3 filter. AP returned
to normal.
STS-49-V-09 Water Spray Boiler System 128:23:42 G.Lt. The pressure sensor did not lmmdiately respond to relief valve crack
2 Regulator Outlet IM49RF05 and reseat. The sensor apparently hung up for one minute and then
Pressure Sensor recovered.
(V58P0204A) KS(:: No troubleshooting required. Hamilton-Standard removed and
replaced sensor during postflight activities.
TABLE II.- STS-49PROBLEMTRACKINGLIST
Number Title Reference Comments
5TS-49-V-10 FES Temperature 128:23:42 G.m.t. There were small transient FES outlet temperature oscillations during
Oscillations IM49RF06 ascent and entry,primaryA and primaryB controllers.
IPR 47V-0021 KSC: Vendor on-siterepackingsensors.
STS-49-V-ll FloodlightFailures
A. ForwardPort 132:21:12G.m.t. Forwardport floodlightwould not illuminateat power up. Light
IM49RF07 remainedoff for remainderof the mission.
IPR 47V-0027
B. Forward Starboard 133:17:15 G.m.t. Forward starboard flickered and then failed to illuminate. Data
IM49RF08 indicates that the most likely cause is a malfunctioning lamp.
IPR 4W-0028
C. Aft Starboard 134:21:11G.m.t. Aft starboardfloodlightfailed to illuminatewhen turnedon. Analysis
IM49RF09 indicatesthat the associatedRPC trippedoff. Probablea short in the
IPR 47V-0029 FEA caused the RPC to trip.
D. ForwardBulkhead 134:21:11G.m.t. The forwardbulkheadlight signaturehad numerous spikesand did not
IM49RF10 come on.
IPR 43V-0030 KSC: Floodlightshave been replaced. Retestingal all floodlights
is completewith good results.
_S-49-V-12 CameraFailures (GFE)
A. CameraD 131:21:40G.m.t. Crew reportedthat cameraD, locatedin payloadhay, had failed.
Camera D was replacedby the cabin cameraduring the secondEVA.
B. EV-2 EMUHelmet 132:17:27G.m.t. During the EMUcheckout for EVA 2, the EV-2 helmet had no picture.
to CameraFailed Eitherthe cameraor the transLitterhad failed.
-,4
KSC: Returncamerasto JSC for evaluation.
STS-49-V-13 SSME I and 2 Hydrogen Ascent Differencebetweenmanifoldpressure and pressure downstreamof the
PrevalvePressureDrop IPR 47V-0006 prevalve is largerthan seen on previousflights. Suspectfaulty
IM49RFII transducers. Melon sampletaken - resultsinconclusive.
KSC: Transducersremovedand replaced. Removed transducerssent to
Rockwell-Downeyfor tests.
STS-49-V-14 OrbitTargetingTI 134:18:30G.m.t. Orbit targetingspecialistfunctionfailedseveraltimes to computea
ComputationFailure proper TI targetingsolution.
KSC: No action required.
STS-49-V-15 Ku-bandAntennaPointing 135:17:00G.m.t. The Ku-bandantennaexperiencedpointingproblems and after steering
Problem IM49RFI2 mode changes,an oscillationof the antennastarted. Also,actual
IPR 47V-0031 anglesdid not agreewith the physical locationof the antenna.
KSC: Beta motorbinding. Removedand replaceddeployedassembly
(DA). EA-I to be replacedwith EAfromOV-103.
TABLE II.- STS-49 PROBLEMTRACKINGLIST
Number Title Reference Co..nents
STS-49-V-16 Cabindp/dt SensorSlow 135:02:54G.m.t. The cabin ctD/dTsensorexhibiteda slower responsethan expected. No
Response IPR 47V-0022 specificationon responserate, but data showing3-4 times slower than
IM49RF14 in-flightexperience.
KSC: Vendorwill remove and replaceat KSC using sensor from spare
panel. No chit required.
STS-49-V-17 PayloadRetentionLatch 135:22:54G.m.t. DuringASEM bottomplane installation,power to the ASEM STBD aft
Assembly (PRLA}4 Latch/ IPR 47V-0017 PRLA 4 mlcroswitchesbecame intermittent. PRLA operatednominallyon
UnlatchIndicatorB Failed both motors. PRl_wiring and connectorsappear to be nominal.
KSC: Troubleshootingplan at KSC revealedno anomaly. (ASEM removed)
STS-49-V-18 RCS ThrusterL4L Leaked 136:18:23G.m.t. After firingthrusterL4L during the RCS hot fire test, the oxidizer
IPR 47V-0015 injectortemperaturecooledto 18 °F. This violatedthe RCS redundancy
IM49RFI5 management(RM)oxidizerfall leak limit temperatureof 30 °F and
thrusterL4L was declared fall leak. The thrusterstoppedleaking,the
injectortemperatureswarmed above 65 °F, and thrusterL4L was put in
last priorityand reselected. Fired three times duringentry without
leak. No vapors afterlanding, slight leak seen afterGSE
installation.
KSC: Monitoringthrusterin OPF.
t_ STS-49-V-19 CRT I BITE 130:16:23G.m.t. A CRT I BITE messagewas annunciatedby generalpurposecomputers
CO IM49RFI6 (GPC's)I and 2. Hardware statusword 2 indicatedkeyboardadapterB
bit set. CRT I recoveredwith DEU I hardware BITE Registerclear
cor_nandon the OTP display.
KSC: DEU fuel I was removedand replaced.
STS-49-V-20Cabin HumiditySensor IPR 47V-0024 Sensor readingstuck at about 30.8 percentthroughoutmission. The
Failure IM49RFI7 sensorshouldhave read at least 50 percentduringthe mission.
KSC: Troubleshootingrequiqred.Potentialsensor replacement.Spares
available.
STS-49-V-21 WCSFan Separator 1 Failed 137:16:25 G.m.t. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to start W_.Sfan separator .1.
IPR 47V-0025 The crew selectedfan separator2 and reportedgood air flow.
KSC: Fan removal from the W_S was completed prior toW CS removal
from the orbiter. Vendor will rework
STS-49-V-22 Port Aft BulkheadPayload 137:17:37G.m.t. Duringpayloadbay door (PI_BD)closure, the port aft bulkheadPLBD
Bay Door (PLB)Latch IM 49RF13 latch indicationswere not obtained. After manuallyattemptingto
IPR 47V-0026 latch,the port PLBD closed indicationwas obtained.
KSC: PLBD latchfunctionaltest successfullyperformed. Left-hand
door poppedinto place when latch was released. Additional
troubleshooting(whichrequiresradiatorremoval)is scheduled.
STS-49-V-23GeneralPurposeComputer Duringtroubleshootingof theorbittargetingfailure,a problemwas
) 1
.,,/
TABLE II.- STS-49 PROBLEMTRACKINGLIST
Number Title Reference Cou_ents
API01SMicrocodeError found in the API01Smicrocode(firmware). Two microcodeinstructions,
and CEDR,will compareequal,even with a differencein bit 40.
KSC: No actionis required. Constraintsto STS-50 cleared.
STS-49-V-24 PCS SystemI Nitrogen IPR 47V-0023 PCS systemI nitrogenflownmtersignaturewas off-nomlnalduring cabin
rlowmeterSignature repressurization.
Off-Nominal KSC: calibrationcheckswill be performedafter panel is reinstalled
in vehicle.
STS-49-V-25 APU 3 GearboxGaseous 137:20:50G.m.lt. APU 3 gearboxgaseousnitrogenpressureand lubricationell outlet
p
NitrogenPressureLow IPR 47V-0019 ! pressurewere lower than normalduring entry.
IM49RF20 KSC: Ullagecheck indicatesthat there is a II0 cc more oil in the
box than prior to the mission, ullage checksrepeated.The
The resultswere withinspecification. Initialullage check was
not performedproperly.
STS-49-V-26APU I InjectorTemperature L37:21:30G.m.t. APU 1 injectortemperaturemeasurement(V46T0174A}became erraticjust
_easurementErratic IPR 47V-0016 prior to APU shutdown. Temperaturedroppedfrom about 1350 °F to
to 750 OF and stayedlow afterAPU shutdownfor I hour 25 minutes, then
returned to normal.
KSC: RepinnedconnectorJ-9 to backup sensor (Primarysensor
debonded. Retest completewith good results.
to
_O STS-49-V-27 EV-3 "PWRRESTART"Message 135:21:IIG.m.t. Immediatelyfollowingselectionof batterypower, EV-3 receiveda
Frozenon DCM (GFE} continuous"POWERRESTART"messageon the DCM display. The BITE light
and all tones clearednominally.
KSC: No actionrequired. Suit returnedto JSC.
STS-49-V-28 EV-2 Loss of DCM Display 135:02:10G.m.t. When EV-2 tried to check the EMU statusduringthe third IntelsatEVA,
(GFE) the displaywas unreadable. This same problemwas also reportedduring
airlock ingress.
KSC: No action required. Suit returned to JSC
STS-49-V-29 EMUBattery S/N 1101 Bad 136:18:03 G.m.t. Middeck and backup battery chargers would not charge battery S/N 1101.
(GFE} It was assumed that the battery had failed.
KSC: No actionrequired. Batteryreturnedto JSC.
STS-49-V-30 TACAN 3 (Collins} 137:17:55G.m.t. TACAN 3, manufacturedby Collins,data indicatedan intermittent
Self-TestFailure IM49RFI9 self-testfailureabout 3 hours prior to landing. AlthoughTACAN range
Identifications and bearingdata were good, data indicatesa Periodicself-test
failure.
KSC: TACANremoved and sent to vendor for rework. TACAN's back at
at KSCfor reinstallation.
STS-49-V-31 EMU 2 Difficultto Mount 136:18:03G.m.t. Crew was unableto installpin in lowerforwardmountingV bracketon
On Airlock Wall EMU2 mount during reinstallation to the airlock wall.
TABLE II.- STS-49 PROBLEMTRACKINGLIST
Number Title Reference Comments
STS-49-V-32 EVA Equipment Failures
A. RetractableTetherReel 134:22:45G.m.t. A. Retractabletether reel failedto retract.
8. Power Tool Tether 135:03:59G.m.t. B. Retractabletetheron powertool broke.
C. PortableFoot Restraint135:04:07G.m.t. C. One adjustablejoinfon portablefoot restraintlost its capability
for adjustment. Probablya jammedadjustmentknob.
D. SafetyTetherReel Lock 136:04:20G.m.t. D. Safety tetherreel wouldnot lock. The lock lever could not move t¢
the lock position.
E. PowerTool Noise and E. A loud noise was heard over the EMU headsetwhen the EVA power tool
EVA Commnlcations was operatedduring the thirdEVA.
F. Mini-Workstation F. The lock knob of the end effectortetherstiffenedup to a high
MechanismProblems actuationtorque. The lockknob of the end effector jaws spun too
freelyto positionsoppositefrom the desiredsetting.
_TS-49-V-33APU 3 Fuel Test Line PR APU-5-0047 After tanking,APU 3 fuel test line temperaturecycled below the LCC
Temperature lower limitof 48 OF.
KSC: Plan to inspectthe heaterand insulation
_TS-49-V-34Radar AltimeterI Out Of RadaraltimeterI averagereadingduring rolloutwas 3.68 feet. It
ToleranceDuringRollout shouldbe 6 +2 feet. (kMRSDtest to recalibrateradaraltimeter1 to
be performed_
;TS-49-V-35Panel F9 Dc Ae_s Signal Severaltimes duringthe flight,the meter displayedsignalstrength
StrengthMeter Sticky duringLOS periods.
KSC: Meter removed, replaced, and retestcompletewith good results.
&-.
O ;TS-49-V-36Window I chippedOn-Orblt Crew photographeda chip in the upper right corner of the thermal
windowpane. Crew reportedthat impactoccurred on or around flight
day 8. Windowhas been removedand sent to NSLD for thermalpane
replacement. The window assemblyhas been returnedand is readyfor
reinstallation.
) ) j
f" ACRONYMSAND ABBREVIATIONS
ABE arm-based electronics
AGT adaptive guidance/throttling
: AMOS Air ForceMaulOpticalAlignmentSiteCalibrationTest
APU auxiliarypowerunit
ARS atmosphericrevitalizationsubsystem
ASEM Assemblyof Stationby ExtravehicularActivityMethods
BFS backupflightsystem
BITE built-intestequipment
CCTV closed-circuittelevision
CED compareextendeddata
CEDR compareextendeddataregister
CPCG CommercialProteinCrystalGrowth
CPD crewpropulsiondevice
CRT cathoderay tube
C/W caution and warning
DCM displayand controlmodule
_P differentialpressure
DS0 detailedsupplementaryobjective
DT0 developmentestobjective
e.d.t, easterndaylighttime
EKG electrocardiogram
EMI electromagneticinterference
EMU extravehicularmobilityunit
ET ExternalTank
EVA extravehicularactivity
FCS flightcontrolsystem
FDA faultdetectionannunciator
FES flashevaporatorsystem
FRF flightreadinessfiring
GMEM GPC memorywrite
G.m.t. Greenwichmean time
GPC generalpurposecomputer
GSE groundsupportequipment
BPOTP high pressure oxidizer turbopump
BPFTP high pressure fuel turbopump
: IAPU improvedauxiliarypowerunit
IFM in-fllghtmaintenance
IPR interimproblemreports
Isp specificimpulse
JSC LyndonB. JohnsonSpaceCenter
LCC LaunchCommitCriteria
41
MADS modular auxiliarydata system _-_
HCC Mission Control Center
HCIU manipulatorcontrollerinterfaceunit
HEC master events controller
HEC0 main engine cutoff
MER mission evaluationroom
MET mission elapsed time
HMT Mission ManagementTeam
MHU mass memory unit
MPESS multipurposeexperimentsupportstructure
HPS main propulsionsystem
MPSS main parachutesupport structure
MSFC George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
HSR Mission SupportRoom
NPSP net positive suctionpressure
OMRSD Operationsand MaintenanceRequirementsand Specifications
Document
OMS orbital maneuveringsubsystem
PAD portable foot restraintattachmentdevice
PAL protuberanceair load
PASS primary avionics softwaresystem
PCS pressure control system
PDRS payload deploymentand retrievalsystem _-_
P.d.t. Pacific daylight time
PFR portable foot restraint
PLID payload identifier
PRLA payload retentionlatch assembly
PRSD power reactant storageand distributionsubystem
PTT push-to-talk
RCC reinforced carbon carbon
RCS reaction control subsystem
RHS remote manipulatorsystem
RSRH redesignedsolid rocket motor
RTV room temperaturevulcanizing
S&A safe and arm
SCU serviceand coolingumbilical
SM system management
SPA servo power amplifier
SRB Solid Rocket Booster
SRSS ShuttleRange Safety System
SSME Space Shuttlemain engine
STS Space Transportation System .
TACAN tactical air navigation
TAGS text and graphics system
TI terminalphase initiation
TPS thermalprotectionsystem/subsystem _-",
42
_-_. UVPI UltravioletPlume Instrument
VCC vernier consistencycheck
VOX voice operated relay
WCS waste collectionsystem2
WETF WeightlessEnvironmentTraining Facility
WSB water spray boiler
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